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This study examines whether a meta-theoretical approach to African International
Relations yields more descriptive utility and explanatory capacity to describing the
behavior and relations of the African state than traditional general theory approaches
based on a single primary determinant. It suggests that a multiple theory - multi-
determinant approach to assessing African state behavior and relations grants greater
theoretical and empirical parallels to state and system realities than single theory -
primary determinant approaches. This study builds a meta-theory of African
International Relations by which to collectively utilize the most commonly applied and
descriptive conventional and non-conventional theories employed in the topic area.
This meta-theory, referred to as Syncarpathic theory, combines a host of
theoretical approaches while negating the inter-theory contradictions that would limit the
utility of each theory based on their differing assumptions. Syncarpathic theory will
provide a model of African International Relations with greater descriptive parallels to
system and state realities. The presentation of a meta-theoretical approach will provide
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an alternative lens by which to view African state behavior and relations addressing the
fundamental problem of “description” existing within African political discourse.
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CHAPTER 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTION
Introduction
The objective of this study is to structure a meta-theory of African International
Relations linking existing conventional and unconventional theories to provide a
comprehensive and empirically accurate description of African state behavior and
relations. In the absence of an accepted general theory of African International Relations
(AIR), the building of a meta-theory provides a more adept means of describing African
state behavior and relations than the applications of singular theories. Conventional
theory referring to the most commonly employed theories of international relations
discourse utilized in the general study of IR in global, multi-regional, and state level
applications; and unconventional theory referring to those theories employed in JR
discourse whose application has not been general but region or state specific. Theories
such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism are all conventional broadly applied in all
regions of the world by academicians. Class theories, systems theory, dependency,
underdevelopment, and neo-colonialism are unconventional applied largely within a
regional context. However, individually each of these theories do not provide
comprehensive explanations of African state behavior and relations nor succeed in
efficiently addressing sub-areas within African state behavior and relations. Given the
existence of this array of partial truths within existing theory, this study opts not to pursue
a new general theory of AIR, but instead attempts to develop a means of employing
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existing theory cooperatively while eliminating the occurrence of inter-theory
contradictions.
The research focus of African International Relations was proposed for a host of
reasons growing out of a survey of the available literature. First, assessing literature
dedicated to African International Relations revealed both inefficiency and deficiency in
presenting African International Relations as a rational general study of state behavior
and relations. The literature set largely does not address in comprehensive and
empirically verifiable terms, the most important questions of state behavior and relations
across a region as vast and diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, inquiries into
African International Relations must of necessity be accompanied by historical,
sociological, cultural, and economic studies.
Second, at this juncture of history, it is necessary to present a rational general
study of African International Relations that provides a clear distinction between rational
decision making processes within the available means of the state, and the deviating
decisions chosen by African leaders. Class, systems, dependency, and underdevelopment
theoretical frameworks have granted too little agency and autonomy to the African state
in both its domestic and foreign policy decision making. The African state has
sufficiently aged and settled into distinct patterns of behavior within the international
system to be discussed as a mature but largely dysfunctional participant in the global
system. This study would provide for a clear identification of those decisions and actions
imposed on the state from those generated by internal factors. The decisions and actions
of the African state must necessarily be presented as a reflection of the actual level of
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agency and autonomy available to the state within the constraints of the international
system. The period of uniqueness and exceptionalism of the African state within AIR
literature exempting it from being discussed as an accountable, rational actor exercising
great degrees of agency has exhausted its academic utility and must be updated to reflect
this maturation period. The building of an inclusive meta-theory of AIR will attempt to
address the shortcomings of previous approaches to theorizing the African state and allow
for the development of a rational theory of African state behavior and relations.
Statement of the Problem
The fundamental problem presented in this research focuses on the inadequacy of
contemporary International Relations studies in presenting African state behavior and
relations as an empirically verifiable reflection of the realities of the global environment.
This deficiency is evident across the literary spectrum regardless of foundational basis in
conventional or unconventional theory. The inadequacies of the literature arise as an
outgrowth of the shortcomings of the theories applied to the topic area which do not
sufficiently generalize African state behavior and relations. The most commonly
employed theories in African International Relations utilize a host of assumptions that by
themselves pose significant problems in comprehensively theorizing African state
behavior in an empirically verifiable manner.
First, the base assumptions within conventional theory in most areas do not
parallel the structure of the African state or the international system. The African state
generally does not meet structuralist descriptions of the state within realism or liberalism,
but is at the same time subject to their assumptions and arguments. Theorists assume the
4
unitary nature of states and that systemic factors have a general impact across all state
units.1 As a result, they fail to address the theoretical challenge presented by structural
differences of the African state which in turn conditions the impact of systemic factors on
states’ behavior and relations. They do not address the implications of the African state
having to contend with the daily requirements and implications of an international order
within which they do not have the operational structure to function.
The utilization of realist and liberalist theoretical frameworks in terms of global
security and neo-liberal economics and institutionalism to structure the international
environment, without the application of their corresponding unit assumptions, grants an
incomplete and contradicting representation of state relations and behavior. Within
international relations, the base unit and its characteristics together with the structure of
the system, produce the central variables in state behavior and relations. This dynamic of
system unit consistency is one of the main factors upon which international relations
theory is built and makes it operational as a means of evaluating behavior. Without the
fundamental unit characteristic element to support the systemic framework of any theory,
there can be limited behavioral assessment without fundamentally altering the theories’
base assumptions.2 Realism as a framework for international order cannot be fully
discussed without reference to the variants of sovereignty, material capabilities, and
national interest. Likewise liberalism cannot be fully discussed without reference to
‘Barry Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, 3” Ed (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 47, 54.
2 Ibid
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international institutionalism and complex interdependency.3
Further, unconventional theoretical frameworks such as development,
dependency, neo-colonialism, and class have not sufficiently described the structural
composition of the African state relative to the general structure of functional states
within the international system. The concepts of state sovereignty and international
intuitionalism are foundational to the modern state and international system and must be
discussed relative to their absence or presence to comprehend state behavior and
relations.4 However, these concepts are not foundational to unconventional theory which
assumes in great degrees, large level absence of autonomy within the African state to act
as an independent actor within the power structure and hierarchy of the international
system. As they are structured, these theories are necessarily divorced from
conventional theories of realism and liberalism holding a host of different assumptions
regarding the structure and functioning of the international system and the states within it.
However, though differing in basic assumptions, no present attempt at theorizing the
African state and its behavior can be wholly separated from these two theories
foundational to the functioning of the contemporary international system.
Second, the unconventional body of theory does not allow for clear identifications
between the independent and dependent variables in the behavior and relations of the
African state. The primary variables within African International Relations are the
Ibid.
Donald M. Snow, International Relations: The Changing Contours ofPower (New York: Addison
Wesley Longman Inc., 2000), 45-50.
Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert Mortimer, Donald Rothchild, and Stephen Johii Stedman, Politics
and Society in Contemporary Africa, 3’ Ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999), 14-22.
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system and state, and there exists significant challenges in deciding whether the
determinants of African state behavior are rooted primarily in systemic or state factors.6
Without clarity regarding the definition of the variables under consideration, there
immediately develops the problem of identifying how state behavioral outputs develop.
Within the developmental framework, there exists diverging positions on the central
determinants in state behavior and relations. Modernization theory suggests that African
states have been unable to significantly develop due to the incompatibility of indigenous
traditional values and culture with modem political and economic institutions and
processes. However, underdevelopment and dependency theories suggest that the
structural outputs of the state are the product of systemic factors in which the most
powerful and influential states and institutions actively deny the African state the means
and ability to implement fundamental state structural changes that will change its
behavioral outputs.7 Further, class theory suggests that the structural outputs of the state
are the product of a meeting of interests between elite classes in both the African state
and system.8 Without a mechanism by which to authoritatively define the variables, there
is no conclusive means by which to review the central determinants of the state’s
behavior within the developmental paradigm.
Within African International Relations, there has not been sufficient theoretical
conciliation between developmental, dependency, neo-colonial, and class positions to the
6 Ibid.
Ibid.
8 Ansa K. Asamoa, On Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa: A guide to the study ofthe process of
Social Transformation (Accra, Ghana: Woeli Publishing Services, 2001), 144-148.
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positions àf the theories of liberalism and realism as the central theoretical determinants
of the structure and functioning of the present international order. This study seeks to
address these multiple problems through the building of a meta-theory of African
International Relations based on the collective assumptions of both conventional and
unconventional theory. With common foundations, each theory may be applied in a
manner that maximizes its utility and mitigates inter-theory contradictions. This meta
theory of African International Relations will be expressed in the form of a model built
on a system of behavioral inputs and outputs. This model will provide an alternate
ordering system for the international environment by which to explain AIR.
As evidenced in the literature review, contemporary efforts towards theorizing
the African state and its relations both directly and indirectly accept theoretical positions
distorting the composition of the international system and general characteristics of the
state units within it. Rather than accept or work around those shortcomings and
positions, this study seeks to present alternate positions and address the inconsistencies
known to be present. This study does not seek to uphold dogmatic positions for the sake
of theoretical traditions which distort the realities of the international environment and
the behavior of the state. Where it is known that a correction need be made, an attempt is
made to place the most accurate information in its place. As a result, several of the base
assumptions in the developed meta-theory significantly differ from many of the
assumptions of the most commonly applied theoretical frameworks to explain African
state behavior and relations.
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Research Question
This study poses and attempts to answer the following question: “Will the
building of a meta-theory of African International Relations linking existing conventional
and unconventional theory provide a more comprehensive and empirically accurate
description of African state behavior and relations than singular general theory
approaches to international relations?
Hypothesis
The building of a meta-theory of African international relations expands the
structural assumptions given to the international environment and its primary variables
beyond the linear assumptions of any one theory. This expansion of base assumptions
allows for the consideration of multiple state behavioral determinants which are more
representative of the multilayered structures of the state and system than a single
determinant. Consideration of multiple behavioral determinants in turn provides a larger
basis by which to analyze and describe the behavior and relations of the state.
Definition of Terms and Concepts
-African State or Post-Colonial African state refers to any one of the 48 states of the African
continent south ofNorth Africa and the Sahara desert. For the purpose of simplicity,
narrative ease, and space considerations, this term shall be interchangeable with the term
“African State” or Post-Colonial African State in referring to any state of the aforementioned
area.
-Artificial Multinational State refers to a state in which multiple national groups or
nations inhabit the boundaries of the state, embracing and maintaining loyalties to social
identifications of ethnicity, race, religion, and culture over an overarching state. The
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designation of this type of state as artificial is derived from its historical creation through
European colonialism and imperialism (or other national colonialism or imperialism)
culminating in its emergence as a theoretically independent entity in the l9” and 20th
centuries.
-Artificial Sovereignly refers to a circumstance in which the state’s territorial composition
and borders have essentially been determined by or in relationship to the former colonial
powers of Europe, and are maintained through external relationships with international
institutions and powerful state actors. Due to the inability of the state by itself to exercise
and maintain all aspects of its own sovereignty, it relies on external forces. As such, the
state’s sovereignty and very existence are largely derived and legitimized by external
elements rather than the state population.
-Domestic Group Security Dilemma refers to a circumstance in which the sociopolitical,
economic, and military gains of one national group are perceived as a decrease in the
sociopolitical and economic security of other competing groups in the state. This
circumstance of perception arises as an outgrowth of the demographic and socio-political
structuring of the artificial state rooted in its past colonial state’s historic policy of forced
population inclusion, integration, and group disempowerment.
-Hierarchical Anarchy describes the systemic imposition of varying levels of anarchy on
states in which relatively weak states are subject to greater levels of structural or
institutional regulation and subordination bordering on governance; while the most
powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy as they structure
and maintain global order in an environment of ongoing self-help.
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-Institutional Inertia refers to the occurrence or development of unusually high levels of
organizational rigidity and complacency within national institutions that limit or constrain
their ability to evolve to reflect the changing needs of society and the state. Institutional
inertia occurs when the national socio-political and economic institutions systematically
reproduce specific socio-political and economic outputs regardless of the type of inputs
into the state. The institutions become rigid and dogmatic in their approach to addressing
societal needs and wants.
-Multi-unit system composition refers to the base units of the international system that
include both the nation-state and artificial multinational state. These state units are
rational actors based on pursuit of their own interest. Most states in the Global South
characteristically fall within the description of the artificial multinational state as opposed
to functional nation-states. The functioning of their institutions and behavioral outputs
differ greatly from the functional nation-states primarily found in the Global North.
-Soft Sovereignty refers to the marginal or limited application of state sovereignty, where
even with the external maintenance of the state’s sovereignty, its structural and
institutional weakness restricts its capacity to fully employ internal or external resources
towards meeting its sovereign responsibilities in a hard application similar to fully
sovereign states.
-Structural and Functional Independence refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the first and upper second tiers of states whose institutions are
organized in such a manner as to allow for the efficient use of resources towards the
Collins Concise English Dictionary (Glasgow, UK: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 1366.
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provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants without external structural support.
Their political systems serve as effective societal organizing tools by which to meet the
collective interests within the state and ensure accountability and transparency in the
extraction, allocation, and distribution of resources. Examples of states of this type are
the United States, Russia, China, France, and Japan.
-Structural Independence and Dysfiinctionality refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the lower first and second tiers10 of states whose institutions are
organized in such a manner as to ensure the basic employ of resources towards the
provision primarily of the essential needs of the state and its inhabitants without external
structural support. Their political systems are organized to an operational degree that
allows resources to be mobilized to meet the most basic needs of the state, but not the
collective interests of its population. These state institutions are organized in a manner
that facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption that adversely affect the state’s
ability to provide for itself as a fully functional entity. The political process and
governments ensure only enough transparency and accountability to enable an inefficient
and limited extraction, allocation, and distribution of state resources. The cumulative
result of the institutional organization of the state is its partial and limited functionality.
However such states have the option of seeking external assistance in areas beyond
essential goods and services. Examples of such states are India, Iran, and South Africa.
-Structural Dependence and Functionality refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the lower second tier and upper third tier of states whose political
systems are organized to a sufficient operational degree to work in concert with external
10 Refer to Chapter 4 (page 70) for descriptions and listings of the three state tiers.
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support systems in mobilizing state resources to meet basic societal wants and needs.
However, the institutions of these states are organized in a manner which allows
significant institutional inefficiency and corruption to necessitate external supports to
mitigate the adverse affects of institutional and organizational weakness. The political
process and governing institutions ensure enough transparency and accountability to
secure external assistance for a functional system of extraction, allocation, and
distribution of basic and essential state resources, goods, and services. Even though
existing in a state of dependency, these states engender an acceptable degree of
functionality and theoretically are on a transitional path to structural independence.
Examples of states of this type are Ghana, Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.
-Structural Dependence and DysJiinctionaliiy refers to the practical condition of states
primarily found in the lower second and third tiers of states whose institutions are
organized in a manner that hinders or negates the efficient employ of state resources
towards the provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants. Rather than serving as
an effective societal organizing tool, the political system enables and facilitates
institutional inefficiency and corruption without organizational or institutional
accountability. The process of resource extraction, allocation, and distribution in these
states is adversely affected and each state’s ability to internally provide for itself is
severely compromised. The cumulative result of the institutional disorganization is a
reliance on external political and economical structural support. Without external
support, many states in the third tier would regress into structural collapse and
institutional failure. These states’ complete reliance on external structural support may
13
also be referred to as dependency. Examples of states of this type are Togo, and Benin.
-Structural Underdevelopment describes a national condition in which both internal and
external factors systematically weaken state institutions and retard its ability to function
effectively or expand. A state’s institutional organization and the nature of international
relationships impede its ability to sufficiently expand its material capabilities towards
providing basic necessities. In this condition of structural underdevelopment, the state’s
sociopolitical and economic institutions are unable to efficiently process societal and
international inputs and convert them into functional outputs in a manner that allows that
process to be cyclically reproduced and expanded. State structural and institutional
expansion is contingent on socioeconomic growth and development in which the
aggregate generation of revenue and increasing complexity of social networks and values
enhances the ability of the state to satisfy an increasing number societal wants and needs.
The majority of states in Sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing prolonged periods of
structural underdevelopment plunging them further into poverty, debt, and civil
instability.
-Structural Penetration describes the condition of a state whose internal structure and
institutions are compromised by the presence of external actors whose actions undermine
or supersede aspects of the state’s sovereignty to a degree impeding its ability to act
within its own interest. A structurally penetrated state’s sovereignty may be so greatly
encumbered by the presence and actions of external actors’ that several of its domestic
and foreign policy decisions and behaviors cannot be discussed in isolation of those
external actors. Examples of structurally penetrated states include Zambia and
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Mozambique.
-Syncarpathic Theory is the meta-theory of African International Relations developed to
comprehensively assess the African state and its relations through a multiple determinant
approach built on existing conventional and unconventional theory. It conceives the state
as a multi-layered eco-social and political organism structured to comprise a
geographically bounded territory, population, governing system, material culture, and
language. In assessing its behavior, the state as a multi-layered entity requires the
consideration of multiple interlocking behavioral determinants to reflect its interlocking
systemic layers. These interlocking behavioral determinants include realist factors,
liberal factors, class factors, structure and function factors, leadership factors, and
perceptionlworld view factors. Every systemic layer of the state is affected by its
interaction with the international environment producing multiple behavioral responses
that cannot be assessed solely under a single determinant such as power or class. The
contemporary state itself parallels the international environment within which it exists
and forms the base unit of the international political, economic, and ecological system.
Syncarpathic theory considers the international environment to be an eco-social and
political organism comprised of interlocking social and ecological systems. The
international environment comprises the global ecological, political, economic, and an
emerging global material culture. These social and biological systems essentially cannot
be separated as they are dynamically linked and changes or actions in any one state can
affect the functioning of others.
-Syncarpathic Model ofAfrican International Relations refers to the post-behavioral
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model designed to operationalize and illustrate syncarpathic theory. The model presents
a system of ordering the international environment and outlining the processes by which
its relations and interactions occur. It is specifically geared towards a systematic
presentation of the behavior and relations of the African state through an identification of
the central determinants in its behavior. Its format streamlines a circular system of
political inputs and outputs through institutional structures and processes that highlight
multiple determinants of state behavior and relations. The model is subdivided into six
segments occurring in sequential order: environment inputs, global variables, behavioral
determinants, variants, institutions, and behavioral outputs. These broad headings house
the foundational general assumptions regarding the international environment,
international system, state units, and the multiple theories describing each behavioral
determinant.
Assumptions
This study carries a host of assumptions in seeking to answer its stated research
question. It first assumes that African state behavior and relations regionally and
internationally can be generalized across a region as vast and diverse as Sub-Saharan
Africa. This assumption is common in the literature and founded on similarities in
geographic region, colonial history, state structure, and structural outputs. While few
notable exceptions exist, scholars apply general political and economic theories to the
region. Second, this study assumes that there is no generally accepted theory of African
international relations capable of comprehensively describing African state behavior and
relations in an empirically verifiable fashion. The seminal text in the field have not
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agreed on a comprehensive general theory of African International Relations and in its
place exists a plethora of theories that have attempted comprehensive descriptions but
achieving only limited and partial explanations. Third, this study assumes the validity of
existing international relations theory as partial behavioral explanations of state behavior
and relations. Each theory represents only a limited and partial truth granting an
incomplete representation of the empirical realities of the state.
Methodology
This is a review of international relations theories as applied to Sub-Saharan
Africa. Its primary focus is the building of a meta-theory of African international
relations utilizing existing conventional and unconventional theory. The theories
employed in the meta-theory include the conventional theories of realism, liberalism, and
their variants; the unconventional theories of class, systems, dependency, neo
colonialism, and their variants; and alternative approaches including civilization theories,
leadership type/style analysis, perception, and psychoanalysis. These theories were
chosen based first on their descriptive utility and second on their positions as the most
highly utilized theories across the spectrum of literature dedicated to the African state and
its relations. The meta-theory will be expressed in a model based on a behavioral system
of political inputs and outputs. The theories will be linked through a host of assumptions
about the international environment and its variables that allow each theory to accurately
define a behavioral determinant in the states behavior without eliminating the validity of
the role of other determinants in those same behaviors.
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Significance of the Study
The fields of African politics and African International Relations stand to benefit
from the building of a meta-theory of African International Relations. This study is
intended to address the theoretical shortcomings in the field hindering the presentation of
a rational general study of African International Relations rooted in empirically verifiable
assumptions and outcomes. The building of a meta-theory of African international
relations hopefully will provide a theoretical foundation upon which future academic
studies in African international relations may be based.
Previous general theory approaches housed very narrow assumptions regarding
state behavior and relations essentially attributing state behavior to a central primary
determinant represented in a single theory. However, general theory approaches face the
challenge of substantiating their positions relative to the state existing as a multilayered
entity comprised minimally of a geographic territory, an economic system, a population,
institutions, a government, culture, religion, ethnic identities, and a social systemJ’
Within the context of 21St century international relations discourse, the assumption that
the behavior and relations of a multilayered state entity could be limited to a single
behavioral determinant represents a purely ideological view unsubstantiated by state
structure or empirical data. However, this theoretical framework assumes differently
presenting the behavior and relations of the African state as the product of multiple
determinants which have been revealed in different theories. These theories will be
linked in a meta-theory for the purpose of facilitating the execution of a multiple
Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories ofComparative Politics: The Searchfor a Paradigm Reconsidered
(Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1994) 44.
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determinant approach to assessing interstate behavior.
The presentation of a multifaceted approach that considers multiple determinants
in the state’s behavior provides greater parallels to the multilayered structure of the state
and system than linear single determinant approaches. The presentation of behavioral
determinants as an outgrowth of the multi-layered structure of the state and system
facilitate a more empirically accurate means of examination and analysis than approaches
housing only single determinants. The utilization of a single determinant is does not
parallel the multilayered structure of the state and system. The assumptions housed in
this study are made to empirically reflect the realities of the international environment
and its variables as opposed to housing assumptions that cannot be substantiated by data.
This was done to separate from the ongoing practice of building on the strict assumptions
of previous scholarship which in many cases are no longer empirically accurate because
they do not reflect the fundamental changes that have occurred in the international
environment. Furthennore, this theoretical framework is intended to simplify the
identification of the role of the state and system as either the dependent variable,
independent variable, or a combination of the two in African state behavior and relations.
Under the present theoretical discourse, this distinction has been very difficult to
determine given the differences in theoretical approaches as expressed in the rhetorical
and literary positions of international institutions, organizations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and African leadership and governments. However, by building a
meta-theory that identifies which behavioral determinants as an outgrowth of each
variable, the active elements may be separated from the sedentary ones isolating the
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dependent variable. Isolation of the dependent variable will in turn allow for an
accounting of the root causes for changes in the state’s behavior.
Limitations of Study
This study is limited to the building of a meta-theory for application to the states
of Sub-Saharan Africa. The states of Sub-Saharan Africa are the primary regional focus
and there will be no attempt to build or evaluate theory for the states of other regions of
the world. Even within Sub-Saharan Africa exists exceptions to the generalities of this
study which will not be addressed within this study. The meta-theory employed in this
study is built on a host of theories: the most common conventional theories of
international relations and their variants (realism and liberalism), the most common
theories applied to assessing the African state and their variants (development,
dependency, neo-colonialism, class), and alternative theories and their variants
(civilization, perception, psychoanalysis, leadership type/style analysis). There will be no
attempt to develop a new general theory of international relations within this study as the
alternative option of building a meta-theory has been pursued in its place. Reasons for
building a meta-theory include historical limitations in the pursuit of comprehensive
general theories of behavior in the social sciences that to date have yielded only limited
and partial explanatory capability.’2 There will also be no attempt to develop any of the
existing theories being utilized, particularly not as a prerequisite to inclusion in the meta
theory. Existing theories in current limited and linear forms are sufficient to build a
meta-theory of African International Relations.
12 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 6-9.
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The conclusions of this study will be drawn from criteria rooted in the basis of
international relations as a field of study. International relations as an academic field
seeks to provide an ordering system by which to understand the international
environment and provide a means by which to systematically assess actor behavior and
relationships. The undertaking of these two goals in turn allows international relations to
be employed as a predictive tool in making future determinations of state behavior and
the conduct of its relationships.’3 Theory is developed and employed as the tool by
which to accomplish this goal of ordering, behavioral and relational assessment, and
future predictions. Theory in turn is evaluated based on its empirical consistency and
parallels to reality in terms of institutional policy, institutional structure, official and
unofficial systemic structures, outputs analysis, and predictive capacity.’4
From this host of criteria, the meta-theory developed in this study will be assessed
based primarily on its utility and accuracy as an ordering system for the international
environment and the interactions within it. The system of order will be practically
assessed based on how closely the model parallels existing official and unofficial
systemic structures, institutions and institutional policy, and structural outputs. Second,
because this study accepts the limited objective truth of existing theory as partial
behavioral and relational explanations in their respective areas, the model will be further
assessed based on the method by which the integration of theory was achieved, its
creation of a logical chronology of actions and events, and its negation of inter-theory




assessment of the utility and efficiency of the meta-theory relative to the employment of
single theories will be made utilizing multiple case studies.
Deficiencies of the Study
The first and most apparent deficiency of this study is that it assumes that the
theories chosen upon which to build the meta-theory are collectively sufficient in their
current forms to explain African state behavior and relations. Each of these theories are
continually being developed and expounded on by their proponents to be more efficient
as well as to accommodate state and systemic changes. However, the meta-theory
developed in this study does not include an internal mechanism allowing for the
expansion of the meta-theory as the theories it is built on grow and are further developed.
There are a host of assumptions used to link the theories based on the current structure
and functioning of the international system and African state. Those assumptions are
subject to change as the international environment fundamentally change which would
require a restructuring of the meta-theory.
Second, only a select number of theories have been included in the meta-theory,
the inclusionary criteria of which was descriptive utility and frequency of use within the
literature set. However, there is a large degree of subjectivity in this selection of theory
and the argument may be made for more or less than the selected theories in this study
upon which to build a comprehensive meta-theory of African International Relations.
Organization of Study
Chapter 1 of this study was dedicated to the introduction of the research question
and topic area, giving justifications for its pursuit and stating the fundamental problem it
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seeks to address. The research parameters were defined along with the basic assumptions
and limitations of the study. A definition of terms was presented to explain all
uncommon terms utilized in proceeding chapters. Chapter 2 of this study includes an
extensive literature review of the theoretical frameworks applied to the study of the
behavior and relations of the African state by both contemporary and classical authors.
Chapter 3 goes on to outline the theoretical framework employed in this study to assess
the behavior and relations of the African state. The most commonly applied general
theories are first evaluated and critiqued including constructivism, realism, liberalism,
class, and development. The meta-theoretical method is introduced as an alternative to
general approaches. Chapter 3 also highlights the limitations of single theory primary
determinant approaches relative to the benefits of a multiple theory multi-determinant
approach. Syncarpathic theory is introduced as a meta-theory for explaining African
state behavior and relations and the Syncarpathic model of African state behavior and
relations is developed as a means of operationalizing and illustrating the theory. Chapter
4 is dedicated to the international environment and describes the major global variables
of system and state introducing alternative concepts such as hierarchical anarchy,
multiple unit system composition, the artificial multinational state, artificial sovereignty,
and soft sovereignty.
Chapter 5 is primarily dedicated to the behavioral determinants in state behavior
and relations and their variants. Section 1 describes the realist factors in state behavior
and relations, explaining those influences centering on conflict and its amelioration in the
absence of a global government to order the international environment and state behavior
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and interaction. Its corresponding variants include power, national interest, material
capability, and balance. Section 2 describes the liberal factors in state behavior and
relations explaining those influences centering on cooperation and global governance in
the absence of a global government to order the international environment and relations
between state actors. Its corresponding variants include international institutionalism,
complex interdependence, globalization, and international aid regimes. Section 3
describes the international class factors in state behavior and relations, explaining those
influences centering on the establishment of an international political hierarchy, and
economic stratification of states within the international system and global economy. Its
corresponding behavioral variants include class conflict, political hierarchy, economic
stratification, institutional regulation, and systemic subordination. Section 4 describes
the state structure and ftmnction factors in state behavior and relations explaining those
influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state as a
national and domestic conduit for socio-political inputs and processor of policy outputs.
Its corresponding variants include structural and functional independence and
dependence, structural institutionalism and institutional inertia, structural penetration,
structural underdevelopment, institutional failure, and structural collapse. Section 5
describes the leadership type/style factors in state behavior and relations explaining those
influences on state relations derived from the type/style of leadership exercised within the
state’s governing structure. Its corresponding variants include national leadership,
democratic leadership, kleptocratic leadership, neo-patrimonialism, and clientilism.
Section 6 describes the perceptionlworld view factors in state behavior and relations
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explaining the influences on state behavior and relations derived from an amalgamation
of elite, mass, and leadership understandings of the international environment and their
preferences for both domestic and international order. Its corresponding variants include
globalist-regional-national views, centrist-peripheral views, polar-satellite views, racial-
ethnic-religious views, and civilizational views. Section 7 is dedicated to policy
institutions and state behavioral outputs. It describes the consolidation process in state
decision making as policy through both its domestic and foreign policy institutions. It
presents domestic and foreign policy as being intermestic in nature, whereas each policy
contains both domestic and foreign policy elements. It concludes with an analysis of
what happens when intermestic policy exits state institutions into the international
environment as behavioral outputs.
Chapter 6 goes on to illustrate the theoretical utility of the Syncarpathic model
versus the realist model in an applied case study of South Africa. This case is presented
to illustrate the greater efficiency and effectiveness of a multiple theory multi-
determinant approach over a single theory primary determinant approach. It specifically
addresses South Africa’s role in the establishment of the African Union and is
accompanied by a diagram illustrating the major assumptions and points of Syncarpathic
and realist frameworks.
In Chapter 7 conclusions will be drawn regarding the descriptive utility of the
meta-theoretical approach and syncarpathic theory in particular. The meta-theoretical
approach as applied in Syncarpathic theory will be assessed based primarily on its utility
and accuracy as an ordering system for the international environment and the interactions
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within it. The system of order will be practically evaluated based on how closely its
model parallels existing official and unofficial systemic structures, institutions and
institutional policy, and structural outputs. Further assessments will be made regarding
the method by which the integration of theories was achieved. Syncarpathic theory will
be evaluated based on its creation of a logical chronology of structure and process in the
form of an operational model by which it illustrates international activity and state
behavior. It will also be judged by the degree of effectiveness by which it negates the
inter-theory contradictions that may necessarily arise in theoretical combines. Last,
prescriptions will be made for future applications of the meta-theoretical method and




The primary literature reviewed discusses the behavior and relations of the
African state. The pieces vary in their theoretical frameworks and are set across a time
period of 60 years. The numbers of texts specifically dedicated to the area of African
International Relations are limited in number both classically and contemporarily,
superseded by more general studies of the African state’s sociopolitical and economic
development. The literature set may be divided into classical and contemporary pieces
including classical authors such as Basil Davidson, Kwame Nkrumah, Franz Fanon,
Walter Rodney, and Samuel Huntington and contemporary authors such as Christopher
Clapham, Edmond Keller, Donald Rothchild, Ian Taylor, Paul Williams, and Daniel
Offiong.
The backdrop to the study of African International Relations is the Cold War that
ensued prior to the African independence period. Realism, as the conventional
theoretical framework of the Cold War both classically and in the post-Cold War period
was employed to describe the international relations of the African state as well as many
other areas of the world. In the first 40 years of African independence, realists placed the
bi-polar politics of the Cold War as the defining element in African state relations. Its
international relations merely being an extension of the geopolitical and geostrategic
considerations of the United States and Soviet Union in their global competition for
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preeminence over the globe. Realism was fundamentally rejected by African-centered
scholars as an effective means to describe the behavior and relations of the African state
because of their fundamentally different assumptions regarding the international
environment and the post-colonial state.2 However, socialistfMarxist thought prior to and
during the independence period pervaded the classical literature dedicated to the relations
and behavior of the African state as the nonindustrialized world harnessed it to explain its
condition within the context of a Western colonialism, imperialism, and global
capitalism. Marxist and Leninist thought were used to describe the system of
international order and the relationships between the actors within the system as the
product of class conflict. Several of the classical African centered pieces are rooted in a
Marxist/socialist framework to provide the foundations for the development of their
alternative theories and approaches to describing the behavior and relations of the African
state.3 However, in-between these two dominant traditions a number of nonsystemic
approaches in the form of statist and civilization frameworks were also applied as a
means of theorizing the African state and its behavior and relations.
In the literature, the first notable theoretical framework arising to explain the
behavior and relations of the African state was neocolonialism. Kwame Nkrumah, the
theory’s most famous proponent, conceived the behavior and relations of the African
state to be largely the product of its relationship with the former Western European
1 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics ofState Survival (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2Ojo, Orwa, and Utete, 11-12.
Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, Afro-Manist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1987), 1-3.
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colonizing states, their allies, international fmancial institutions, and international
organizations.4The African state even though theoretically independent is essentially a
satellite or client of a former colonial state and is structured institutionally to reproduce
domestic and international outputs consistent with colonial type relationships.
Leadership in the African state is either manufactured internally or externally to
reproduce individuals willing and able to facilitate such a relationship. The international
relations and domestic politics of the state are dictated by its neo-colonial relationships as
opposed to concerns of national interest, security, power maximization, international
institutionalism, or class.5
Within the context of anti-colonial struggle and post-colonial independence,
socio-psychological analytical frameworks and perception studies were introduced to
explain the condition of the African state and its behavior and relations. Franz Fanon
popularized this approach as he presented the behavior and relations of the African state
as the outgrowth of an ongoing internal and external battle to forge a cohesive African
identity. The colonial African identity was forged through intense violence and an
independent African identity must also necessarily be forged through violence within an
insecure international environment.6 The African and African state are continually
bombarded by international, state, and non-state actors with prescriptions for identities
apart from that of independence. Former colonial powers reinforce an identity and
Kwame NKrurnah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage ofImperialism (International Publishers Co.,
Inc., 1966).
Ibid.
6 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth (Paris: HarperCollins Publishers & Grove Atlantic, Inc.,
1967).
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position of subservience for the African state in spite of the independent identity
struggled for through violence by the African state. The African state is itself internally
torn between the identities of those individuals historically circumscribed and relegated
to a menial and difficult African life, and those living a more privileged existence
predicated on Western education, norms, behavior, and relationships. As a result, the
relations and behaviors of the state revolve around a conflict between these two groups in
economic, political, and social spheres for control over a national identity. This conflict
and question of identity itself must be settled through violence and force, as these
identities were established and maintained by violence and force enacted by the
colonizer. The behavior and relations of the Affican state will be continually riddled with
conflict and security issues until the internal and external question of its identity is
settled.
By the mid 1 970s, a host of statist approaches differing from the neo-colonial and
psychosocial frameworks became popularized as a means of theorizing the African state
and its relations. Basil Davidson, the most famous proponent of this approach to the
African state, framed its behavior and relations as an outgrowth of the historical
dysfunctionality of the nation-state in Sub-Saharan Africa.8 The nation-state that
emerged in the region, initially hoped to be a means by which to introduce and integrate
Africa and its peoples into the modern world, functions to reinforce domestic insecurity,
civil instability, and widespread poverty. The nation-state models imposed and adopted
Ibid.
Basil Davidson, The Black Man c Burden: Africa and the Curse ofthe Nation-State (New York:
Three Rivers Press, 1992).
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by Sub-Saharan Africa engender a certain sociocultural and political incompatibility with
the local populations. Particularly in as much as they have not been effective mechanisms
by which to address the political and developmental needs of the state. Instead, these
state and political models largely allow for the manipulation of the political system in a
manner that retards the political and economic growth and development of the state.9
The international relations of the state likewise are reflective of this incompatibility
between the African state’s governing structures and institutions and the sociocultural
makeup of African society. Its international relationships serve to expose the state to
mass exploitation and international insecurity as opposed to minimizing or mediating the
insecurities and dangers the international environment imposes on the state.
In an expansion of applied systematic thinking and approaches, development and
dependency theories were developed to explain Africa’s specific circumstances in the
global system. The premier proponent of this approach, Walter Rodney, essentially
described the relations and behavior of the African state as an outgrowth of its historical
underdevelopment by Western European powers.’° The African state’s historical and
contemporary relationship with Europe, its allies, and international institutions and
organizations, restricted its capacity to grow and develop into a functionally independent
actor capable of internal self development. Through the international system, African
state’s primary resources are systematically extracted from the state in a manner that
deprives the state of the breadth of the wealth those resources generate. As a result, the
9lbid.
‘° Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Overture Publications,
1972).
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state is unable to generate enough revenues to purchase or produce essential capital and
consumer goods and services towards the building of its own extractive and economic
capacity. The state is then relegated to dependency on goods, services, and credit from
those actors who generate the most wealth from the extraction of African primary
resources.11 As a result, the relations and behavior of the state either become an
outgrowth of international efforts to reinforce the system of underdevelopment, or
internal efforts to halt the system of underdevelopment and achieve development and
growth. The state and its leadership will be structured to achieve either of these two
goals in the conduct of both its international relations and domestic politics.
Among classical authors, Samuel Huntington is the chief proponent of the
civilizational approach to state relations, describing state behavior and relations as the
product of a global competition between the world’s most prominent civilizations. 12
Among states, this civilizational competition manifests itself along cultural, religious,
lingual, regional, traditional alliances, economic, and military lines. States cooperate or
engage in conflict based on these varying civilizations factors in efforts to achieve
influence or dominance over competing civilizations, and within their own civilizational
grouping. Conflict is most likely to manifest in those geographic areas where
civilizations meet or border each other, particularly where civilizational lines overlap
within a state or geographic region. 13
‘ Ibid.
12 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1 (July/August 1993).
Ibid.
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Within the context of this civilizational framework, the African state since the 7th
century Muslim invasions may be described as being caught in the middle of a
civilizational conflict seeking to draw it into multiple civilizational groups. The state’s
behavior and relations consequently reflect this tug of war, both internally and
externally.’4 On the African continent and in the African Diaspora, there are those
groups and individuals seeking to establish the African region as its own civilization pole.
African independence, African unity, and economic integration and regionalism, all
represent efforts to establish an African centered civilization. However, the former
Western European colonizers of Africa, even after the era of African independence,
continually seek to reintegrate the African region into the sphere of Western civilization.
Simultaneously, the broad adherence to Islam in every sub-region of the continent serves
to draw large portions of it into the Turko-Islamic civilization. Furthermore, the large
scale entry of the Chinese and Indians into the continent further complicate the
civilizational loyalties of the continent as the Indo and Sino civilizations seek to extend
their influence across the continent. The African state possibly suffers from a condition
of civilizational schizophrenia where its relations and behavior are dictated by the
civilizational forces most strongly pulling the state into its sphere of influence. ‘ The
overwhelming dominance of France in Central and West Africa, the Arab domination of
the Sub-Saharan governments of Sudan and Mauritania, the practice of Islamic law and
government in Senegal and Nigeria, the dual membership of Somalia and Djibouti in the
14 This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to the African
continent.
15 This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to the African
continent.
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African Union and Arab league, and the large multi-racial compositions of South Africa,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe are all symptomatic of the civilizational competition existing on
the African continent.
The close of the Cold War essentially ended the classical period of scholarship
within African International Relations as the world transitioned to a unipolar international
order based on liberal and neoliberal regimes. Existing theory was reassessed and
reapplied and new theory developed to describe the behavior and relations of the African
state in lieu of new systemic changes. African International Relations became dominated
by literature centered on African state and regional transitions from the realist
frameworks of the Cold War to the neoliberal international economic order of the
unipolar world. Africa’s place and position within the new international order was
closely examined particularly with regards to the capacity of the African state to
modernize, grow, and develop within the new order.
Among neorealists, Christopher Clapham presents a security based framework on
what he describes as the post-Cold War international relations of the African state as the
product of ongoing efforts to maintain and achieve state survival from a position of
relatively limited power within the international system.’6 He develops an alternate
realist framework that views international relations from the bottom up perspective from
those states with extremely limited power and influence, as opposed to the traditional top
down view, from the system’s most powerful states. Within this view, African state
behavior and relations revolve around ongoing efforts to ensure that the state does not
‘6Ctopher Claphani, Africa and the International System: The Politics ofState Survival (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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dissolve under the pressures exerted upon it by the international system and state actors.
In lieu of its power deficit and fragile state structure, the African state has employed a
host of conventional and unconventional means by which to ensure its continued
existence in the international system. These survival strategies and techniques determine
the relations and behavior of the state with very real consequences for the lives and
security of the individuals living within the state.’7
Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild adopting a combined neo-realist and neo
liberal framework describe the behavior and relations of the African state in the post-
Cold War as a reaction to the breakdown of the 30 year realist security frameworks of
that period.’8 The breakdown of the global security regimes organized and maintained by
the superpowers immediately manifested itself in terms of regional and sub-regional
balances of power, civil stability, and domestic order. Where strong stabilizing agents
did not exist, interstate conflict, civil conflict, economic collapse, or chronic instability
ensued regionally or sub-regionally. African state behavior and relations are part of a
transitional global process of redefming and reconstructing regional security frameworks
through which to ultimately achieve state security and a stable international order. Due
to the Sub-Saharan African region lacking stabilizing agents, the reestablishment of
regional and sub-regional security frameworks and regimes has been a turbulent process.
The region has required the aid of external agents such as the United Nations (UN),
European Union (EU), and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to help manage the
17 Ibid.
18 Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State
Sovereignty and Region Security (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
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transition from the realist security frame frameworks of the Cold War, to new security
frameworks facilitating African participation in the post-Cold War neoliberal economic
order. As such, the African stat&s behavior and relations are based on efforts to achieve
security through the reestablishment of national, sub-regional, and regional security
frameworks. 19
Mulugeta Agonafer goes on to utilize a political economy framework in
evaluating the behavior and relations of the African state. He expresses African state
behavior and relations as an outgrowth of efforts to transition from military security
paradigms of the Cold War to the neoliberal economic security paradigms governing the
new economic international order. This new economic order emphasizes global
economic security over military security, necessitating state national participation and
integration into the global economy.20 Daniel Offlong using a neoliberal framework goes
on to further examine the fundamental dynamics of the new international order in which
state security is increasingly defined in terms of economic participation and production
value chains. In the new order, economic participation is valued over realist Cold War
value system founded on geostrategic and military concerns. Each state is required to be
a global economic competitor in order to ensure its survival relative to the competitive
efforts of other states. In the 21 century era of globalization and interdependency, the
fundamental determinants in state behavior and relations revolve around healthy
Ibid.
20 Mulugeta Agonafer, Africa in the Contemporary International Disorder: Crises and Possibilities
(Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1996).
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participation and integration into the global economy.2’Those states best able to
participate and effectively integrate themselves into the global economy at the highest
levels, gain the greatest economic and political benefits. Those states unable to
effectively integrate, participating only at the lowest levels of the production value chain
are relegated to a position of marginality within the global economic system. However,
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the civil-political-economic deterioration of the 1990s that
accompanied the breakdown of Cold War security regimes, teamed with the failures of
the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, significantly retarded the capacity of the
African state to compete in the new neo-liberal economic order. Political and civil
instability, limited infrastructure, large scale debt, wide spread disease, and a lack of
financial transparency severely curtailed the ability of the state to meaningfully
participate in the global economy.22
Offiong goes on to explain that most African states have encountered significant
challenges in achieving the necessary paradigm shifts to transition from security
paradigms to economic paradigms. Every subregion of the continent has required
external forces to maintain peace and security accompanied by large economic packages
comprising humanitarian assistance and fmancial aid. The short term result has been that
in the era of economic globalization and political interdependence, African states have
the means to participate marginally on the periphery of the global economy. 23 The
21 Daniel A. Offiong, Globalization: Post-Neodependency and Poverty in Africa (Enugu, Nigeria:




politics of the state in turn revolve around the movement of the state from a position of
economic and political marginalization to a position of meaningful inclusion and
participation. This process of transition from one security paradigm to another becomes
the central determinant and influence on African state behavior and relations.
Taylor and Williams fundamentally reject as a starting point for African
International Relations, arguments based on Africa’s international economic
marginalization and internal political decay in the neoliberal economic order. Rather,
they assert that the ongoing behavioral and relational challenges of the African state are
reflective of its ongoing interaction with the imposing forces of the outside world that
adversely affect the ability of the state to manage both its domestic and international
political affairs.24 They describe the relations and behavior of the African state in the
post-Cold War period as the outgrowth of ongoing attempts to manage state interaction
with a host of international actors seeking to enter into relationships with the African
state beyond the realist security politics of the Cold War. These actors seek to occupy the
economic and political space left by the superpowers in their retraction from the
continent. The ongoing globalization of the world since 1989 has forced all regions of
the world to evolve and transition their behavior and conduct their relationships to reflect
this global scale economic interaction between state and non-state actors.
As a result, the average African has become an ongoing participant in the
contemporary globalization process and is affected both directly and indirectly by the
24 Ian Taylor & Paul Williams, Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the continent
(New York: Routledge, 2004).
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daily requirements and adj ustments those global processes impose on the state.25 The
relations and behavior of the state are then understood to be dictated by: ongoing efforts
to effectively manage its neo-liberal economic relationships with state and non-state
actors; the effective meeting of the basic structural requirements of globalization, and the
mitigation of the adverse effects of globalization’s processes on the state and its
population.
This short review of both the classical and contemporary literature reveals two
notable shortcomings endemic to the available literature set in explaining the
international relations of the Sub-Saharan African state in general behavioral terms.
First, even though each author employs a theoretical framework that is clearly
informative in its subfield, representing a limited truth, each assessment represents a
largely linear approach to the study of the African International relations. They center
largely on singular aspects of state behavior and relations as the central determinants in
the ongoing management of the state’s international relationships. Regardless of
considerations of perception, global security regimes, transition, development, class,
global economy, or global economic and cultural imperialism; none of the theoretical
approaches presented in the classical and contemporary literature represents a
comprehensive theoretical framework inclusive of multiple behavioral determinants
paralleling the multilayered structure of the state. Each author in employing a presumed
general theory assumes that the determinants of the state’s behavior and relations can be
isolated and narrowed to one central determinant to explain all of the state’s decisions
and actions. Given the validity of the limited truth presented in each theory, this study
25 Ibid.
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fundamentally assumes that the behavior and relations of the state cannot be
comprehensively explained utilizing a single theory presenting a single determinant.
As a multi-layered entity, different aspects of the state are inherently linked to
distinct behavioral determinants, those determinants to a specific set of behaviors, and
those behaviors in turn impacting the other aspects of the state which are inherently
linked to other behavioral determinants.26 No single determinant in the state’s behavior
can necessarily be divorced from the impact of other behavioral determinants in a truly
behavioral assessment. The state’s actions and decisions are founded on consideration of
multiple factors, even if only in varying degrees, as the outcomes of those actions affect
the state in a multiplicity of ways. The objective of theory ultimately is not to identify a
single or central determinant in the states behavior, but to describe as fully as possible the
behavior and relations of the state.27
Examples of such theoretical shortcomings may be seen in Christopher Clapham’s
realist framework in citing state survival as the African state’s central behavioral
determinant. Within his assessment, there arises the distinct challenge of assessing the
prevalence of state failure and collapse in every subregion of the African continent in the
I 990s given that they were not inevitable events. The pattern of state failure and collapse
in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda,
Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, Angola, and Mozambique do not suggest
that the general objective of those states was survival. Other determinants need to be
26 This assessment is the position of the researcher in applying a civilizational framework to the African
continent.
27 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 6-9.
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identified particularly in lieu of the continuing necessity for international institutions and
actors to provide international economic aid, peacekeepers, and humanitarian missions to
ensure the survival of several states. Keller and Rothchild also encounter significant
challenges in citing the “realist to liberal” transitions of the post-Cold War as the central
determinant in African state behavior and relations. The instances of civil war during and
after the Cold War continue in consistent percentages and the region’s international debt
continues to climb within the neoliberal order. State expenditures in both the Cold War
and post-Cold War periods have continued to be disproportionately matched in favor of
military spending over infrastructure, education, and the production of essential primary
agricultural goods. The argument of “transition” as the primary behavioral determinant
does not account for those behaviors and actions continuing from one period into another
with great consistency. The assumption of a single primary determinant to explain this
phenomenon ultimately provides an incomplete understanding of the state, as its specific
behaviors continue beyond the prescriptions of that single determinant. Consideration of
multiple determinants is necessary to explain the consistencies and changes in state
behavior and relations that go across many periods.
The second theoretical shortcoming present in the literature set is its general
founding on theoretical assumptions that do not necessarily parallel the contemporary
realities of the international system and its units. Numerous realist and liberalist
assumptions that held true in the I 950s or 1 990s simply cannot be substantiated in the
post-September 11th world. The African state largely does not meet the general state
structural characteristics of realism or liberalism, nor do their system-unit descriptions
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wholly reflect the structure of the international system in any manner that can be
empirically verified. In particular, realism assumes the unitary nature of state units in
structure and behavior, and that systemic factors have a general impact on all state units.
The African state is theoretically subject to the same assessments, requirements, and rules
of a system it is not functionally structured to operate within. As a result, realist and
liberalist frameworks have been utilized to structure the international environment for the
African state in terms of military, security and economic institutionalism without the
application of their corresponding unit descriptions. Within the contemporary literature,
Taylor and William’s efforts at theoretical discourse through such a partial lens leads
them to conclusions patterned on unconventional theory within a conventional theoretical
framework.
Likewise, unconventional theory also has continued to hold the general
assumptions that cannot necessarily be substantiated by empirical evidence.
Unconventional theory continues to hold the assumption that the African state has only a
minor degree of autonomy in its domestic and foreign policy decisions. Neocolonialism,
development and dependency, and marginalization studies all support this type of
position. However, the regional decision making patterns and actions of the states of
Sub-Saharan Africa suggest that this assumption is presently unfounded. Rather, it
suggests that African state leadership may be exercising larger degrees of autonomy and
agency in decision making than was previously experienced during the Cold War.28 This
is evidenced in the excessive downgrading of the state without the Cold War powers to
28 Ian Taylor, “Blind Spots in Analyzing Africa’s Place in World Politics,” Global Governance,
no. 1O(2004):411-417.
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dictate policy or insulate it from the outcomes of poor decision making and corruption.
This study seeks to address the weaknesses of the literature through the building
of a meta-theory of African International Relations utilizing a multiple theory multi-
determinant approach with assumptions reflecting the actual realities of the African state
and international environment. It does not merely seek to build on the assumptions of
previous theoretical traditions without scrutinizing those assumptions against an
empirical evaluation. Such an approach to African International Relations will provide
the basis for more comprehensively descriptive studies of African state behavior and




This study proposes a meta-theoretical approach over a general theory approach to
theorizing the behavior and relations of the African state. Such an approach is meant to
address the multiple problems of previous general approaches by utilizing multiple
theories and multiple behavioral determinants. However, the meta-theory houses a host
of general theories linked to provide a broader analysis of state behavior and relations.
Constructivism is utilized as the primary evaluation tool to critique the most applicable
general approaches within conventional and unconventional bodies of theory. As an
analytical tool, constructivism is inherently linked to empiricism and the scientific
method which form the epistemological foundations of this study within international
relations theory. The two primary conventional theoretical frameworks discussed and
critiqued in this study are realism and liberalism. These two theories were chosen as the
two most widely utilized theoretical frameworks in international relations upon which the
present international order has been built.’ The primary unconventional theoretical
frameworks discussed and critiqued in this study are development, dependency, and
class. These theoretical frameworks were chosen as the most consistent and commonly
applied frameworks in analyzing the African state and its relations outside of
conventional theory. These theories developed in historical succession in lieu of the
‘Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, The Global Future: A BriefIntroduction to World
Politics, 2nd ed. (California: Thompson/Wadsworth, 2007).
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perceived shortcomings of realism and liberalism’s ability to adequately theorize the
African state.
Constructivism as a tool for analyzing theory
This study adopts constructivism as its theoretical beginning, utilizing it as a tool
by which to understand the international environment and identify theory’s relationship
to the state of natural order, constructed social order, and individual perceptions and
worldviews.2 Constructivism utilizes the scientific method as an analytical tool, as the
scientific method provides the most accurate means by which to gather and analyze the
empirical data emerging out of the natural world. Out of the scientific method emerges
theory as tool or lens by which to order the natural and social world, making it intelligible
to human beings.3 Constructivism relies on other theories and paradigms for the layout of
any form of structure or system. It essentially makes a separation between what is
perceived as naturally occurring social and environmental order and a changing
environmental and social reality shaped by the preferences of human beings.
Constructivism highlights the role of worldview and perceptions and outlines the
subjectivity of theory based on its normative starting point.4
Social constructions include international systems, states, political systems,
economic systems, and racial identities; while physical constructions include objects such
as cities, militaries, railway systems, and airports. A direct and dynamic correlation
exists between social constructs and physical constructs as mutually reinforcing elements
2 Kegley and Raymond, 46,49.
Olatunde Ojo, D.K. Orwa, and C. M. B. Utete, African International Relations (Essex: Longman
Group Limited 1985) 7-9.
Kegley and Raymond, 49-51.
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of change. Social changes influence environmental changes, and environmental
changes influence social changes in a continual and circular process throughout history.5
Constructivism isolates which force is dictating the changes and indicates whether theory
parallels the changing reality of the system.6
Within the context of a constructivist framework, this study regards the structure
and norms of international as a reflection of the world view and preferences of specific
actors within the international environment as opposed to reflecting a natural state of
social and environmental order. The contemporary international system, rooted in realist
and liberalist theory, functions by these principles because the most powerful actors in
the system wish for it to operate by those principles. The present international order’s
structure, system, units, and rules are not germane to its participants, a large percentage
of which do not meet unit characteristics described by its base theories. Further, it is
arguable that a significant percentage of states in the system do not agree with the
theoretical basis of its rules of behavior as outlined in realist and liberalist theory and
would prefer an alternate set of rules more amenable to their needs. In assessing the
utility of realism and liberalism, this study assumes that the theory is not necessarily
structured based on empirical truth or a science based epistemology. These theories are
strongly influenced by the interests of specific parties in their presentation and structuring
of international order and its interactions.
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics,”




Constructivism grants the theoretical basis for the questioning of these theories’
capacity to describe African state behavior and relations in an objective and empirically
verifiable manner outside the interests of the state’s strongest actors. Further,
constructivism grants adequate justifications to question the validity of the foundational
assumptions of development, dependency, and class paradigms utilized by Africanist
scholars as alternatives to realism and liberalism. Their assumptions of the absence of
autonomy and agency in the policymaking and implementation process of the African
state pose serious challenges to empirical and statistical verification.8 In questioning the
adequacy of the assumptions of conventional and non-conventional theories as unnatural
and impermanent, this study lays a foundation for building assumptions on empirical data
and not theoretical tradition.
A Critique of Conventional Theory: Realism & Liberalism
Realism and liberalism are the two leading paradigms utilized in conventional
international relations theory and are the two primary theoretical influences on
international behavior and norms in the contemporary international system.9 Realism
presupposes the centrality of state sovereignty as the principal value of the members of
the international system and is state-centric holding individual countries as the most
important units of the system. Realism holds that the realization of national interests is
the primary motivator of state behavior and interaction, and that power primarily in its
military form is the ultimate means by which disputes between states are adjudicated in
an anarchic system. Liberalism, however, seeks to foster peace through political and
8 Lan Taylor, 4 1-4 17.
9Kegley and Raymond, 28.
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economic institutionalism as a means of fostering cooperation and mitigating conflict
among states. Liberalism advocates the utilization of institutions and organizations to
formally establish behavioral norms among states utilizing the same institutions and
organizations to discipline or punish states not adhering to the rules of international
order.’° Today’s rapidly evolving international system is a complex interplay between
the two with global governance and institutional balances of power in the absence of a
global government.
Both realist and liberalist forms of international order represent imperfect
constructed realities that are brought into being and maintained via the exercise of power
by the leading actors in the international system. They do not represent a perfect, natural,
or permanent order that irrefutably must be maintained to ensure an acceptable level of
international organization. Continual systemic changes and present and ongoing
challenges in the international system sufficiently dispel any notions of permanence or
perfection. By themselves, they are insufficient to fully describe the motivations behind
state behavior and international relations beyond the aversion of conflict and war through
military security, and maintenance of peace through institutional cooperation.’
Power is ultimately the means by which realist and liberal orders are constructed
and maintained and power or its loss are the means by which those constructed realities
may be changed.’2 These power-based forms of order result in building theory on
idealized forms of order which do not necessarily reflect the empirical realities of the
°Kegley and Raymond, 29-32.
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics,”
International Organization 46 (Spring 1992) : 39 1-425.
12 Ibid
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international environment. They have a particular challenge in generalizing the
behavioral motivations behind the actions of the state. Realist and liberalist scholars
essentially construct their theories on the world as they think and hope it is, assuming the
exercise of power in military, economic, and institutional forms will ultimately bring that
ideal into being. 13 As a result, their foundational assumptions are rooted in an ideal
environment (system) and object (nation states) constants that do not and will not
necessarily hold true in all circumstances, but are justified as necessary for the
formulation of a rational general theory of international relations. Liberalism and
realism’s theoretically descriptive and analytical shortcomings are maintained through
the use of power to make international order and state behavior conform to theory, even if
only in a partial aesthetic form.’4
Proponents of realism and liberalism justify this method of structuring general
theory on the idea that system wide behavioral theories must be dependent on the actors
in the system exercising the most power and influence in both the military and economic
spheres, posing the most tangible threats or benefits to the functioning of the system.’5
Weak states such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, based on their level of influence,
power, and international political and economic participation in the system; are not held
to be significant enough international actors upon which to base a rational and general
behavioral theory of system and states. These states have little impact on the structure
and behavior of the system and its most influential actors and do not militarily or
‘ This is the position of the researcher after having reviewed both the contemporary and classical
literature in the topic area.
14 Hughes, 48-50, 79-80.
‘ Ibid.
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economically threaten the existence or functioning of the system. As such, they need
not warrant full consideration in the formation of general behavioral theories of
international relations because their impact is minimal.
This approach poses significant challenges to an empiricist based analysis of the
state and system as several of these generalizations do not take into consideration at
minimum 25% of the states participating in the system.’6 An example of this form of
theoretical structuring may be seen in the basic ordering of international relations into a
system of corresponding units. Realism’s assumption of unitary consistency among
states across the system as expressed in the unitary rational actor principle is intended to
allow for broad generalizations regarding unit behavior. The base unit of the
international system is held to be the state in its nation-state format, generally assumed to
be a rational actor with similar basic responses to systemic factors.’7 However, even the
most remote empirical observation of the international system suggests that a significant
percentage of states, mainly among nonindustrialized states comprising the majority of
states in the international system, are structured differently and express a great variation
in behavior from industrialized and industrializing nation-states.18
In spite of the structural and behavioral deviation among states in the system,
realism assumes not only the structural similarity of state units (nation-states), but also
similar levels of functionality between states. Participating states are assumed to be
functional or on a path to becoming functional nation states with like behaviors. Instead,
16 The states of Africa alone comprise 54 of the world’s almost 200 states.
17 Hughes, 46-47.
18 Lisa Anderson, “Antiquated before they can Ossify: States that fail before they form” Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 58, no. 1 (Fall 2004) :9-li.
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realism makes distinctions between the power, capabilities, and interests of different
states within the system as a means of explaining their differences.19
However, a significant percentage of states including those of sub-Saharan Africa
do not structurally resemble or behave in the fashion of a nation-state and it has become
highly questionable as to whether they will ever transition to functional nation-states.
Global developmental projections suggests that it is likely that most of these states will
either remain cyclically dependent and weak with great possibilities for future failure and
collapse, or possibly even evolve into another social organization form altogether. 20 Of
the world’s almost 200 states, the majority of the 48 sub-Sahara African states arguably
do not fit the description of the nation-state or general rational unitary actor relative to the
functional nation-states in the international system. General assumptions of this type
based “ideally” on the nation-state significantly distort the formal structure, functioning,
and basic system-unit agreement of the international system for most of the states on the
African continent.
The proponents of realist theory have sought to maintain theoretical consistency
in structural make up and outcomes through the use of political, economic, and
institutional power. The system’s most powerful actors maintain unitary consistency in
the real world through the conferring of state legitimacy within the international system
on states that not only fail to resemble the nation-state in any way, but do not display the
characteristics of a sovereign state to any recognizable degree. Both state and institutional
power is used to maintain a system of states through territorial, diplomatic, and
‘ Hughes, 47-50.
20 Anderson, 1 1-13.
51
institutional recognition and economic support where according to conventional
definitions, states technically would not exist. 21
Likewise, liberalism’s preferences for international institutionalism and economic
interdependence assume that participation in the first instance, and cooperation in the
second instance, are generally desirable, rational, and in the interest of all the system
units.22 Liberalism does not assume that conflict and noncooperation may rationally be in
the interest of state actors leading to greater benefits than those gained from
cooperating.23 Furthermore, liberalism overlooks the possibility of preferences for class,
civilization, religion, ethnicity, or race over the socioeconomic and political benefits of
institutional cooperation. All factors which may serve to obstruct the process of
cooperation which in reality is conditional for both applicants and participants. Due to
liberal assumptions being a reflection of the preferences of the system’s most powerful
and influential actors as opposed to general attitudes substantiated by data, power is
exercised to bring about environmental conditions where the cost of nonparticipation is
significantly higher than the cost of cooperation. Regimes of international isolation,
sanctions, and force are tools in the present international order to encourage participation
and discourage noncooperation.24 However, if liberalist assumptions were generally true
for all state units, no such measures would be necessary to assure participation and
cooperation. Furthermore, liberalism assumes that economic and political
21Jbjd
22 KjelI Goldrnann, The Logic ofInternationalism: Coercion and accommodation (London: Routledge,
1994) 23, 27-28.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 30-3 1.
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interdependency and interconnectedness are the best method by which to reduce
conflict, foster cooperation, and achieve international order.25 However, the structure of
international institutions and their distribution of benefits may instead serve to reduce
cooperation as opposed to encouraging it.26 The hierarchical nature of international
financial and political institutions dictates that those states ranking highest in the
international status quota of states accrue the greatest institutional benefits while those in
the lowest positions accrue the least. As a result, majority of states in the system receive
the smallest tangible benefits from it and have the greatest incentive to dissociate.
The Case for the Inclusion of Conventional IR Theory and Approaches
Much of the literature dedicated to the African state assumes unfavorable
positions regarding the pure application of realist and liberal conventional approaches to
describe the behavior and relations of the African state. Instead, significant literature
favors development, dependency, and class theories to describing African state behavior
and relations. Generally, conventional theory has not been deemed compatible because
sub-Saharan African states do not meet system unit characteristics of realism or
liberalism. 27 Conventional theory did not account for the unique circumstances and
history of the continent, nor did it explain in significant detail, factors influencing the
behavior of African states within their unique circumstances. However, this study deems
the inclusion of conventional theory as necessary to the building of a meta-theory of
African International Relations as conventional theory undergirds the foundations of the
25 Ibid, 2.
26 1-fughes, 56.
27 Ojo, Orwa, and Utete, 11-13.
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present international order.
The most important and fundamental positions against the applications of both
realist and liberal theories in African state relations are derived from its historical
artificiality, lack of state level nationalism, absence or lack of strong elements of state
sovereignty, and limited power position in the international system relative to the
system’s most powerful actors.28 These factors form the basis of the development and
application of alternative theory to describe African state behavior and relations.
First, the general primacy of allegiance to sub-national identities over national
identity has created a condition in which the African state has no truly national unit from
which to formulate national interest.29 In sub-Saharan Africa, there still exists general
identification and allegiance to secondary identities of race, ethnicity, and class over a
national identity.3°African state institutions are not structured to guarantee the pursuit of
middle range objectives in the midst of competing sub-national interests. State foreign
policy is heavily slanted towards the interests of the ruling elite’s class and ethnic
grouping as opposed to the state as a whole.31 Consequently, there can be no true
effective pursuit of a truly national interest in its foreign relations without a national
consensus on middle range objectives and an effective means to ensure their
28 These factors are have been deemed by the researcher the most important in the application of
conventional theory to the African state. Different authors cite a host of minor factors that are all founded
on these four fundamental factors. Olatunde Ojo and D.K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, African International
Relations (Essex: Longman Group Limited 1985).
29 Joshua B. Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004) 1, 3.
° Davidson, 226-229.
H Ojo, Orwa, and Utete, 43-44.
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advancement. Only through an institutional consolidation process based on democracy
or moral authoritarianism can a truly national interest be pursued within a state of
competing multinational interests. The concept and pursuit of national interests are
foundational to realist frameworks and necessary for the participatory assumptions of
liberalist frameworks. The grand majority of artificial states formed in the twentieth
century birthed out of European colonialism have to date generally failed to form the
organic social cohesion that fosters the state level nationalism necessary for the
mobilization of effective state building and consensus on national objectives.32
Second, the limited presence or absence of state sovereignty in the Africa makes it
incompatible with the basic assumptions of conventional theory. Since their
independence, most African states have been unable to fulfill the basic responsibilities of
a sovereign state. Instead, they have a fictitious form of statehood legitimized by
international institutions and the system’s most influential states. n The theoretical
foundations for discussions of the modern state system in conventional theory are
founded on the core principle of state sovereignty, placing the state’s ruling elements as
its highest governing authority within the international environment.34 This international
regime of state sovereignty presently provides the basis for cooperation and conflict in an
environment of international anarchy, and is foundational to the discussion of
international relations. The inability of the state to maintain and act out its sovereignty in
pursuing its national interests, enhancing its material capabilities, and participating in
32Anderson, 6-8, 10-12.
Pal Ahluwalia, Politics and Post-colonial Theory: African inflections (London: Routledge, 2001) 53.
Kegley and Raymond, 27.
55
international institutions and organizations relegates it to a position of less importance
relative to the system’s sovereign states. Based on traditional definitions of sovereignty,
African state sovereignty has to be assumed or imagined to be compatible with
conventional theory.3 Without this assumption or imagined condition, there would be no
way to operationalize the condition of “limited or absent state sovereignty” within
realism or liberalism.
Third, due to the power deficit of the African state relative to the system’s most
powerful actors, the structural realities and characteristics of the African state are not
taken into consideration in the assumptions of realist and liberalist theory. Conventional
theorists traditionally and contemporarily structure general behavioral theories of the
state primarily around the international system’s most influential and powerful actors. In
particular, around those actors who play a central role in the maintenance of the system,
or pose a substantial threat to the stability, maintenance, structure, and existence of the
system. 36 General behavioral theory is not built around states in a transitional phase
towards nation states, regressing, or teetering on failure and collapse. Behavioral
considerations of less significant states are discussed ancillary to behavioral and
functional norms and as problems, challenges, and imperfections in the system.
Historically, most African states have been weak relative to the most powerful and
influential states in the system. They have been unable to significantly enhance their
power and material capabilities singularly or through participation in international
organizations towards the effective pursuit of their national interests.
Anderson, 10.
36 Goldstein, I 1-12.
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In spite of these theoretical challenges, this study argues for the inclusion of
conventional theory into a meta-theory of African International Relations based on a host
of factors. First, the most elemental argument for such a position is founded in the reality
that the international system in which the African state exists is founded on realist and
liberalist principles. The most powerful actors in the international system occupying the
largest percentage of political, economic, and military activity and interaction have
established and maintain a system of international order consistent with the tenets of
conventional realist and liberalist theory.37 As such, realism and liberalism must
necessarily be a part of the theoretical discourse of all international relations.
The contemporary system of international order provides the parameters within
which the African state as a relatively weak actor must act and interact in attending to its
needs and basic requirements. Not acknowledging or including these frameworks in
African International Relations fundamentally obscures empirical assessments of African
state behavior by minimizing the impact of the system’s structure on African state
behavior and relations. Essentially delinking the behavior of the system’s units from the
system in which they are a part and operate. In order to retain theoretical consistency, the
foundational organizational principles of conventional theory upon which the structure of
international system itself is based, must form a key part of the discourse.
Second, the juridical recognition and granting of state sovereignty and
international institutional membership (United Nations) upon the African state even
though unable to fulfill the basic requirements, subjects it to the general behavioral
Goldmann, 23.
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requirements as other states in the international system.38 As a result, even though not
fully sovereign or fully participating in international institutions/organizations, the
African state is subject to the challenges posed by state sovereignty and international
institutionalism. The juridical sovereign recognition of the African state along with its
concession to actively participate in the global political, economic, and financial system
make it virtually impossible for the state to escape conventional theory. By opting to
participate in the international system according to its rules and system-unit structure, the
African state has acknowledged and accepted the tenets of liberalism and realism in its
behavior and relations.
Third, sub-Saharan Africa’s marginal position in the global economy, low ranking
in regional power and influence, cyclical dependency, massive debt, and minuscule
influence in international institutions place the African state in a unique position of
inclusionary but unequal participation in the international system. The implications of
which are that the African state has little to no means by which to influence the structure
of the international system and its behavioral norms. However, in the post-Cold War
period, the social and economic conditions of the African region have indirectly become
significant determinants in the interpretation of select behavioral and institutional norms
in the international system.39 Conditions in post-colonial Africa have been central in
defining the roles of the World Bank, IMF, and UN in the post WWII period as agents in
third world nation building and development. For the past 50 years these institutions
Anderson, 10.
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have provided economic aid, financed development projects, and funded peacekeeping
and humanitarian aid (assistance) programs to third world states.40
International reactions to extremes in domestic African state behavior account for
the diversion of significant international resources from the system’s most powerful
actors and institutions to the African region and continually pace the discussion on North-
South relations.4’ Nation and state building assistance and humanitarian aid occur as an
outgrowth of neoiberalist and neorealist objectives of humanitarianism, peace keeping,
restoration and strengthening of sovereign state capacity, and the building of stable
regional balances of power through institutionalism.42 These neoliberal and neorealist aid
regimes account for significant percentages of African state relations and their impact
cannot be divorced from regional assessments of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Fourth, complex interdependence, a core concept of neoliberalism, has served to
link both weak and strong states politically and economically in the ongoing maintenance
and growth of a globalized world economy. States are linked in a manner making them
dependent on numerous other states’ productive capacity whereby adverse behavioral
changes in one state adversely affect the states to which it is linked both politically and
economically.43 The full integration of the sub-Saharan African region into the
globalized economy as a primary resource extraction point for the production and
maintenance of essential consumer, industrial, and techno-informational goods has
° I. William Zartman, CollapsedStates: The Disintegration and Restoration ofLegitimate of
Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995) 210, 213, 221, 223, 232.
“ Ibid, 221, 232, Ellis, 137.
42 Kegley and Raymond, 256-257, 340.
Ibid, 34.
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resulted in a complicated security problem where the constant threat of civil instability
in the African state triggers the possibility of segmented destabilization in the global
economy.
As a result, the system’s institutions, organizations, and most powerful states
devote significant time and resources to the region to ensure its stability and functional
participation in the global economy. As long as the African state continues to participate
in the global economy and rely on international actors for the maintenance of basic civil
and economic stability, its behavior and relations cannot be divorced from the neoliberal
and neorealist regimes that maintain the system. Conventional theory must be included
in a meta-theory of African international relations in order to properly reflect the
structural and behavioral realities of the international system.
A Critique of Development Frameworks and Approaches
Development frameworks in their multi-variant forms have become the most
consistent and common means of theorizing the African state and its relations. The
variant forms of the developmental paradigm include modernization, underdevelopment,
dependency, structural adjustment, and presently marginalization. These variants all
attempt to discuss African state behavior and relations within the context of efforts
towards or against the modernization of the African state in the post-colonial period.44
Developmental frameworks explain to the role of rationality, culture, state structure,
class, environment, leadership, and systemic structure in enhancing the growth,
improvement, and enhancement of the state’s ability to provide for the needs of its
Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1996), 8-11.
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populations and maintain its territorial integrity.45This approach poses several
challenges in generally assessing the behavior and relations of the African state.
First, like other general theoretical approaches, it assumes that the state’s behavior
and relations can be reduced to a single behavioral determinant; an assumption not
reflective of the multilayered structure of the state. The state is comprised of several
interlocking parts that influence its decision making process, actions, and relationships.
Further, the international system within which it exists is also comprised of several
interlocking parts that also influence state behavior. 46 Deductive reasoning suggests that
a single determinant is insufficient to describe the behavior of a multilayered entity
existing in a multilayered environment. The assumption of a single determinant is purely
subjective without empirical evidence for such a position. Further, African regional
behavior has not suggested that in the event of the existence of a single primary
determinant, that determinant is development.
Second, regional and sub-regional development indicators and national
expenditures do not indicate general region wide efforts among most African states to
enhance their development prospects over the past 45 years.47 State expenditures suggest
a general diversion of resources from the foundational development areas of education,
infrastructure, and essential staple agricultural products to military expenditure, personal
aggrandizement, and corruption.48 Further, with few exceptions even sub-regional
Sally Mathews, “An African View of Post-Development Theory” Third World Quarterly vol. 25, no. 2
(2004) : 375-376.
46 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations 6th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 10-Il.
47Ake, 12-13.
48 Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Sizing up the African state” The Journal of liJodern African Studies, 38, 1
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political and economic organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa have generally proven to
be ineffective tools by which to spur rapid and sustained development. With the
exceptions of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East
African Community (EAC), African sub-regional economic organizations have acted
more effectively as agencies for addressing sub-regional conflicts, security, and sub
regional politics.
A constructivist analysis suggests that the theoretical focus on development in the
African state is the preference of multiple parties who wish for the discussion of the
African state to be placed within this context. References to development in the African
region by African leadership have largely been rhetorical exercises inconsistent with the
actions of the state. Much of the international political-economic relations of the states
of the region are more suitably categorized as economic, security, and humanitarian
stabilization efforts as opposed to development efforts. The developmental approach
does provides informative utility on the question of development which is important, but
without generally genuine efforts to develop regionally it does not provide much utility in
assessing the driving factors in African state behavior and relations.
The Meta-Theoretical Method
This study proposes a meta-theoretical approach over general theory approaches
utilizing a single theory with a primary determinant. The presentation of a meta
theoretical approach is meant to address the multiple challenges of general theory




behavior and relations. Given the assumption of the validity of existing international
relations theory as partial behavioral truths, within the meta-theory must be developed a
means of employing existing theory cooperatively eliminating inter-theory
contradictions. The theories included in the meta-theory were chosen first for their
descriptive utility and second for their positions as the most highly utilized theories
within the AIR literature.
However, the building of a meta-theory of international relations on preexisting
theory presents a foundational problem; there are fundamental conflicts between the
theories in their approaches to theorizing the behavior and relations of the African state.50
The conflicts between the theories are based both on common theoretical assumptions as
well as philosophical and methodological differences. First, each theory assumes the
primacy of a central determinant in the state’s behavior and that its particular determinant
is the most prominent factor in state relations. Second, each theory approaches
international relations from a unique philosophical base differentiating it from other
approaches. Third, the base assumptions and system-unit descriptions regarding the
international environment are fundamentally different based on its theoretical tradition.
The philosophical bases upon which the theories are formed cannot be changed as
those are the factors that grant theoretical diversity allowing each theory to describe
different aspects of state behavior and relations. The absence of philosophical diversity
in international relations theory would destroy any basis upon which to pursue a meta
theory of African international relations. However, the second and third factors can be
addressed in such a manner as to make the building of a meta-theory feasible while
50 The assumptions of IR theories are different based on philosophy. Goldstein, 6-9.
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utilizing existing theory. The assumption of multiple interlocking determinants over a
central determinant approach; and changes in system-unit descriptions to reflect empirical
data may be undertaken without destroying any participating theories.
The Multiple Theory Multi-Determinant Approach vs. Single Theory Primary
Determinant Approach
General theory, or single theory primary determinant approaches generally
utilized in the study of international relations begin with the assumption that the
determinants in the states behavior and relations can be isolated and narrowed to one
central determinant to explain all of the states decisions, actions, and relationships
(Figure 1).’ The process of deduction suggests that the behavior of a complex
multilayered organism cannot be subsumed under a single behavioral determinant.
This meta-theoretical approach frames the behavior and relations of the African
state as organismic, the product of multiple interlocking determinants which have been
revealed in different theories. As a multilayered entity, different aspects of the state are
inherently linked to distinct behavioral determinants, those determinants to a specific set
of behaviors, and those behaviors in turn impacting other aspects of the state which are
inherently linked to other behavioral determinants. As a socially organismic entity
comprised of interlocking parts, no single determinant in the state’s behavior can
necessarily be divorced from the impact of other behavioral determinants in a truly
behavioral assessment. This approach occurs in with close parallels to the arguments for
and against globalization’s complex interdependence in which the socioeconomic






























































of the globe to which it is connected. The state’s actions and decisions are founded on
consideration of multiple factors, even if in varying degrees, as the outcomes of those
actions affect the state diversely. The recognition and consideration of multiple
behavioral determinants grants a closer parallel to the multilayered structures of the state
and system and provides a larger basis for analysis than a theory presenting a single
behavioral determinant. As a result, a multiple theory multi-determinant approach is
necessary to properly frame and categorize African state behavior and relations (Figure
2).
Expansion of Assumptions
The difference in foundational assumptions between theories provides the third
operational challenge to the building of a meta-theory of African International Relations.
Though base assumptions vary across theories, they are inherently rooted in the same
environmental variables of state and system. Realism assumes generally experienced
anarchy within a rational unitary actor system with power as the central behavioral
determinant. Liberalism assumes rationality based on institutional rules established
within international institutions to guide cooperative participation in a global political and
economic system in the absence of global government. Class theory assumes that the
international system is based on class divisions not only within states, but among states
extending into the structure of international institutions. Underdevelopment, dependency,
and neocolonial theories assume the absence of large levels of both domestic and
international autonomy among weak states, great levels of control by strong states, and
that the international system is structured to benefit stronger states while cyclically

















































To effectively link the theories, a set of empirically verifiable assumptions
regarding the international environment and its variables must be formed to provide a
base for their individual execution while maintaining theoretical agreement. This
necessarily dictates that the empirically verifiable assumptions of each theory must be
kept, for without them there would be no theory. The questions then arise as to whether
these empirically verifiable assumptions can exist together, and whether they negate the
explanatory capacity of each theory. This study answers that question in the affirmative
as empiricism is isomorphic not internally contradicting, whereas empirically verifiable
environmental assumptions will not contradict parallel empirically verifiable structures
and outputs.52
As such, realism’s propositions of power, interest, material capability, and
balance are not nullified by class and liberal assertions that anarchy is hierarchically
experienced as opposed to generally experienced based on the onset of global governance
through international institutionalism and economics. Anarchy is a reality of the system;
it is just experienced in varying degrees across the units. Likewise, realism’s premise of
unit rationality is not destroyed based on liberalism’s assumption of rationality based on
institutional rules and norms of participation and cooperation, as rationality itself rather
than its derivative is most important to realism. The concept of unit rationality still
remains without the concept of the unitary rational actor, as rationality is not
preponderant on the like units. Unconventional theory’s assertion of the existence of
multiple base units within the international system, as opposed to a unitary actor
52 Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey
Press, 1968), 57-58.
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conception, leaves adequate room for institutional and interest-based actor rationality.
Liberalism’s assumption of international institutionalism and interdependence are not
made less relevant because of class theory’s assertion that they are dominated by
hierarchy and stratification factors. International institutions are hierarchically based on
power and the normative factors surrounding participating state actors. The global
economy is itself also stratified based on the international division of production and
labor, and each state’s position in the global economic value chain in the center or
periphery.54
The historically dysfunctional structure of the African state and its social
institutions actually serve to reinforce arguments of its susceptibility to leadership factors
which ultimately direct the state’s interests towards establishing international
relationships of dependence or independence. Relationships of dependence possibly
leading to the undermining of both the state’s material capabilities and position
internationally; while relationships promoting independence possibly enhancing its
power, material capabilities, and position in the international system. Likewise, the
increasing levels of decision making autonomy in the post-Cold War period do not make
irrelevant the role of the structure of the international economic and political system in
the behavior and relations of the state.
From the position that the verifiable general assumptions germane to each theory
do not nullify the explanatory capacity of the other relevant theories, those same
assumptions will form the base of general assumptions for the meta-theory of African
G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the future of the West” Foreign Affairs vol. 87, no. I
(January/February 2008) : 33.
“ Hughes 352, 354.
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international relations. Utilizing common assumptions allows each theory to
accurately delinc a single determinant in the state’s behavior without eliminating the
validity or role played by other determinants in those same behaviors. This process of
expanding the structural assumptions given to the international environment beyond the
linear assumptions of any one theory effectively expands the number of behavioral
determinants under consideration in a state action. Under common assumptions each
general theory merely becomes an identification tool for a specific behavioral
determinant; only differentiated from the others by its philosophical approach to
describing behavior. This process is meant to mitigate conflict between theories allowing
for a seamless integration of theory. Possible contradictions that may arise within the
meta-theory would likely be reflective of internal structural contradictions within the
state itself as opposed to its common assumptions.
Syncarpathic Theory
Syncarpathic theory is the meta-theory of African International Relations
developed within this study to comprehensively assess the African state and its relations
through a multiple determinant approach built on existing conventional and
unconventional theory. It conceives the state as a multilayered ecosocial and political
organism structured minimally to comprise a geographically bounded territory,
population, governing system, economic system, material culture system/set, and
language systemlset. In assessing its behavior, the state as a multilayered entity requires
the consideration of multiple interlocking behavioral determinants to reflect its
interlocking systemic layers. These interlocking behavioral determinants include realist
factors, liberalist factors, class factors, structure and function factors, leadership factors,
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and perceptionlworld view factors. Every systemic layer of the state is affected by its
interaction with the international environment producing multiple behavioral responses
that cannot be assessed solely under a single determinant such as power or class. The
contemporary state itself parallels the international environment within which it exists
and forms the base unit of the international political, economic, and ecological system.
Syncarpathic theory holds five basic assumptions regarding the structure and
functioning of international environment and its primary variables. First, the
contemporary international environment is understood to be an ecosocial and political
organism comprised of interlocking social and ecological systems. The international
environment is minimally comprised of the global ecological system or the environment,
the international political system, the global economic system, and an emerging global
material culture. These social and biological systems essentially cannot be separated as
they are dynamically linked and changes or actions in any one affect the functioning of
the others with global reverberations. The global ecological system houses all human
social systems and is the platform sustaining human life on the earth. The atmosphere,
oceans, and land sustain life and their maintenance and preservation cannot be separated
from the political, economic, and, cultural development of human beings. The
international political system is the highest level of human organization dominating the
international environment housing the global population. The international political
system serves to order and construct behavioral norms and guidelines for states and their
interaction between themselves and nonstate actors. States in turn implement policies
regulating actions towards the environment and provide the base of operations for the
global economic system and its financial institutions.
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The global economic system facilitates the global production process of
extracting, converting, and distributing resources. Currently, global capitalism through
international markets facilitates this process where state actors, companies, multinational
corporations, and individuals compete and exchange goods and services. International
financial institutions facilitate terms of trade, monetary exchanges, and the raising of
capital for continued investment in the production process. Global level economic
production and distribution of goods and services has facilitated the emergence of an
internationalized material culture that is converging across states worldwide.
Increasingly, the processes used to provide essential goods and services globally are
becoming uniform across states and in many areas centralized and produced from single
regions to the rest of the world. Goods and services such as energy, transportation,
textiles, essential staples, clean water, and military equipment are essentially produced in
the same or similar manner across the globe. The tools, methods, and means of
production between states are increasingly the same or similar with paralleling social and
environmental fallouts as global demand increases. The rapid industrialization and
development of select regions of the world systematically increase consumer demand as
more individuals are able to maintain a modem lifestyle entailing the requisite goods and
services that make modem life possible. The question regarding the sustainability of the
emerging international material culture brings into concern the strains that increasing
demand for its economic production will place on the global environment and
international political system. Second, Syncarpathic theory assumes that the international
environment exists within a state of anarchy in the absence of a global government. This
state of anarchy is hierarchical in nature, experienced in varying degrees across states
72
based on their relative strength and position in the system. Third, there is the assumed
existence of an international political and economic system (international system)
maintaining international order and organization within this state of anarchy. The
international system is organized into political and financial institutions and organizations
that are hierarchically structured and stratified according to power, material capability,
class, civilization, ethnicity, race, religion, and ideology among other factors. Fourth, the
system’s base units are states of different compositions and structure (multi-unit system
composition) accompanied by a host of non-state actors including IGOs, NGOs, IFIs,
MNCs, international terrorist organizations, national liberation movements, political
parties, and transnational crime syndicates. The state units forming the base of the
system include both the nation-state and artificial multi-national state. Fifth, these
multiple state units are generally held to be rational actors based on the pursuit of their
own self interest.55 The states within the international system are assumed to comprise
three tiers of states: the first and smallest numerical tier comprised of the system’s
strongest states, the second tier of mid-ranged strength states, and the third and largest
numerical tier comprised of the system’s weakest states. Syncarpathic theory assumes
that the definition of twenty first century state security is varied across state tiers
comprised of both military and non-military challenges that may or may not be
transnational in nature.
The Syncarpathic Model of African State Behavior and Relations
The Syncarpathic Model of African State Behavior and Relations (Figure 3) is the
Neoliberal and constructivist thought have expanded conceptions of rationality that go beyond the
realist concept of rationality based the unitary actor principle.
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post-behavioral model designed to practically operationalize and illustrate syncarpathic
theory. The model presents a system of ordering the international environment and
outlining the processes by which its relations and interactions occur. It is specifically
geared towards a systematic presentation of the behavior and relations of the African
state through an identification of the central determinants in its behavior. Its format
streamlines a circular system of political inputs and outputs through institutional
structures and processes that highlight multiple determinants in state behavior and
relations. The model is subdivided into six segments occurring in sequential order:
environment inputs, global variables, behavioral determinants, variants, institutions, and
behavioral outputs. These broad headings house the foundational general assumptions
regarding the international environment, international system, state units, and the
multiple theories describing each behavioral determinant.
International Environment (3a)
This model begins with the assumption that there is an international environment
existent on the globe in which all human beings and life exist and contend for order arid
fulfillment of their needs and wants. More specifically, the international environment
refers to the collective territorial and social organizations of the globe and their constant
internal actions, and external interactions with each other from a position of limited
resources and scarcity.56 These actions and interactions constitute specific behavioral
patterns that may be systematically examined and measured to identify the motives or
basis for those particular actions.57 On an ongoing basis, the international environment






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































constantly bombards the state with requirements, requests, challenges, and obstacles
that must be effectively addressed to ensure the state’s survival and effective interaction
with other international actors. The collective environmental dynamics constantly facing
the state are referred to as environmental inputs.
Global Variables (3b)
A secondary assumption is that the international environment is organized into a
system (international system) founded on a hierarchical system of anarchy.8 That
system is comprised of multiple base units59 (multi-unit system composition); the state
units dominating the international environment are generally rational actors based on
pursuit of their national interests. 60 The multi-unit composition of the international
system includes the nation-state as well as the artificial multinational state61 historically
emerging out of European colonialism. The determinants in the state’s behavior and
relations emerge as an outgrowth of the primary global variables of state and system.62
The systemic influences on state relations refer to those influences emanating from the
structure and order of the international environment; while state influences refer to those
influences emanating from the structure and organization of the state. System-based
behavioral determinants include realist factors, liberal factors, and international class
factors; and state based determinants include structure and function factors, leadership
58Goldstein, 10.
Ibid, 10.
60 Ibid., 68, 102.
61 This term and its definition have been introduced by the researcher.
62 Goldstein, 16.
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factors, and perceptionlworld view factors. The behavioral determinants are identified
through multiple theoretical frameworks and their variants as indicated in their titles.
Behavioral Determinants and Variants (3c)
The realist factors in state behavior and relations are identified as those influences
centering on conflict and its amelioration in the absence of a global government to order
the international environment and state behavior and interaction. Its corresponding
variants and multiple incarnations include power, national interest, material capability,
and balance.63 The liberal factors in state behavior and relations are those influences
centering on cooperation and global governance in the absence of a global government to
order the international environment and state behavior and interaction. Its corresponding
variants include international institutionalism, complex interdependence, globalization,
and international aid regimes.64 International class factors in state behavior and relations
describe those influences centering on the establishment of an international political
hierarchy and economic stratification of states within the international system and global
economy. 65 Its corresponding behavioral variants include international class conflict,
political hierarchy and economic stratification, and institutional regulation and systemic
subordination.
The state structure and function factors in state behavior and relations refer to
those influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state
as a national and domestic conduit for socio-political inputs and processor of its
63 Hughes, 47, 48.
64 Ibid., 53-56.
Kegley and Raymond, 40-42.
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outputs. Its corresponding variants include structural and functional independence
and dependence, systemic dependency, structural institutionalism, and
underdevelopment. Leadership factors in state relations refer to those influences on state
relations derived from the type of leadership exercised within the state’s governing
structure.67 Its corresponding variants and multiple incarnations include national -
leadership, democratic leadership, kleptocratic leadership, neo-patrimonialism, and
clientilism. The perceptionlworld view factors in state behavior and relations describe
the influences on state behavior and relations derived from an amalgamation of elite,
mass, and leadership understandings of the international environment and their
preferences for both domestic and international order.68 Its corresponding variants
include globalist-regional-national views, centrist-peripheral views, polar-satellite views,
racial-ethnic-religious views, and civilizational views. Each of these views or
perceptions factor directly into the ongoing behavior, actions, decisions, and relations of
the state.
Institutions (3d) and Behavioral Outputs (3e)
Through institutional process the environmental inputs bombarding the state are
systematically converted into behavioral outputs.69 The inputs and requirements imposed
on the state are filtered through state institutions that ideally in consideration of all
pertinent factors develop formal behavioral responses in the form of foreign and domestic
66Chilcote, 133,135.
Kegley and Raymond, 63-65.
68 Hughes, 39-40.
69 Chiclote, 127-129, 133-135.
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(public) policy.70 These institutions vary and may be centralized or decentralized
based on the governing structure of the state.71 In the century era of globalization
and complex interdependency, policy formulation has emerged largely as intermestic in
nature.72 The intermestic policy refers to the development of domestic and foreign policy
so closely linked to both national and international outcomes that they cannot be
generally separated from each other in the process of policy formulation.73
Intermestic policy exits the state as behavioral outputs, entering the international
environment where it adds to the milieu of activity comprising the environmental inputs
constantly bombarding all states in the system. Beginning again with the assumption of
the international environment, the process restarts itself in continuity of the ongoing
behavioral life cycle of the state and maintenance of the international system.
° Robert 0. Keohane and Helen V. Mimer, Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 48-50.
71 Kegley and Raymond, 59-60.
72 Keohane and Milner, 3-4.
Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process 5th
ed. (Belmont, CA: WadsworthlThomson Learning, 2003), 373.
CHAPTER 4
GLOBAL VARIABLES
The System (The International System)
Syncarpathic theory first assumes that in the absence of a global government, the
international environment exists in a state of anarchy with no world government to
provide for the needs of all of its inhabitants.’ Within this state of anarchy, the
international environment is organized into a political and economic system2dominated
by multiple state units at its base (multi-unit system composition).3 However, the state of
anarchy is hierarchical in nature, experienced in varying degrees across states based on
their relative strength and tier in the system. The international system itself is organized
through a number of international political and financial institutions and organizations.4
These institutions and organizations are hierarchically structured and stratified5according
to power, material capability, class, civilization, ethnicity, race, religion, and ideology
among other factors. Its state units are accompanied by a host of non-state actors both
inside and outside the system including IGOs, NGOs, IFIs, multinational corporations
(MNCs), international terrorist organizations, national liberation movements, political
‘Goldstein, 74.
2 Ibid., 74, 76, 104.
Ibid. 10.




parties, and transnational crime syndicates.6
Hierarchical Anarchy
Hierarchical anarchy describes the systemic imposition of varying levels of
anarchy on states in which relatively weak states are subject to greater levels of structural
or institutional regulation and subordination bordering on governance; while the most
powerful and influential states experience the greatest degree of anarchy as they structure
and maintain global order in an environment of ongoing self-help. Conventional
conceptions of systemic anarchy present it as a system wide condition generally
experienced by all state units.7 However, this study deviates from conventional
conceptions of anarchy instead holding it to be experienced in varying degrees across
states based on their power, material capability, structural composition, type of economic
system, and rank in the international hierarchy of states.8 A critical evaluation of
systemic anarchy versus the mixed structure of the contemporary international system
suggests that the weaker the state and the lower its position in the international hierarchy
of states, the greater its regulation and subordination to international institutions and
organizations to a degree bordering on governance.9
The states of the international system may be informally divided into a hierarchy
of three tiers of states: the first and smallest numerical tier comprised of the system’s
6 Goldstien, 12-14.
Ibid., 74.
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 106.
This analysis is the position of the researcher after examining both anarchy and liberalinstitutionalism.
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powerful and influential states, the second tier of mid-ranged strength states, and the third
and largest numerical tier comprised of the system’s weakest states.10 The third tier states
experience the smallest degrees of anarchy within the system due to their dependence on
the system. The third tier states are the most highly subject to the system’s rules and
conventions and largely have no means by which to impact the rules from their relative
position in the system. The first tier of states contemporarily experiences the greatest
degree of anarchy within the international system as they maintain the system of
international order. However, most first tier states are not materially dependent upon the
international system for their material well being and survival. First tier states face the
greatest security threats from other first tier states, second tier states wishing to forcefully
enter the first tier, and non-state actors wishing to fundamentally alter or break the
system. The second tier of states experiences a degree of anarchy greater than the third
tier, but significantly less than the first tier. Second tier states may or may not be
dependent on the system for their survival and material needs, but stand to benefit greatly
from participating in the system and following its rules. Select second tier states have the
potential or possibility to enter the first tier and may pose a substantial threat to the first
tier based on aspirations to join it.”
The position of weaker states in the system make them reliant on it for survival as
the system makes available necessary resources in the form of international aid that
enable states to survive. Ongoing access to those resources requires adherence to
10 Goldstein, 79-81.
1 The positions on the degrees of anarchy are the theoretical conclusions of the researcher after
examining anarchy, structural realism, and liberal institutionalism.
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systemic rules and norms set by the most powerful and influential states that enforce
them on systemic participants to ensure their compliance.’2 These institutional forces
mitigate the effects of anarchy as the weaker and least influential states as a consequence
of participation must answer in some degree to governing bodies of these institutions and
organizations. Further, within an environment of self help, international aid regimes are
made available to the weakest and least influential sates mitigating the effects of the
security dilemma on those states as they rely on international institutions, organizations,
and powerful states for their survival.’3
The greater role of international institutionalism in the post-World War II
international system along with the onset of globalization and complex interdependency
in the post-Cold War world are responsible for the imposition of intense levels of
regulation and subordination on the weaker and less influential states.14 The intense
levels of systemic regulation over the system’s weakest states is largely rooted in their
dependence on the system’s institutions and most powerful actors for the maintenance of
their territorial integrity and daily material survival.’5 In many areas, this relegation and
regulation by the system’s institutions goes beyond the realm of choice for the state
where adherence to international rules and norms are a requirement for systemic
participation and access to vital tools, resources, and services. The international system’s
institutions and most powerful states take on a paralleling role to governance for weak
12 Goldmann, 30.




states in regulating international economics and trade, aiding in the provision of regional
and civil security, and providing aid packages, credit, and financing.’6
The most powerful states undergirding and maintaining the system exist within an
environment of complete self-help with no higher governing authorities to whom they
must answer. They maintain the system as a means of mitigating interstate conflict and
maximizing the benefits of interstate cooperation.17 Powerful and influential states set
the rules and norms of the international system and make their resources available within
a systemic institutional pool to aid weaker states as it meets their interests to do so.18
They do not necessarily need the system to survive and are not reliant on it to secure their
own material survival or to receive essential resources.19 The absolute anarchy
experienced by the most powerful states relative to each other, with no higher
organization authority existing, warrants international institutionalism and international
regimes to mitigate the security dilemma growing out of international anarchy.2°As a
result of being the most powerful and influential actors in the system, the system’s top
tier states experience the greatest degrees of anarchy with no greater authority over them
to order their interactions.
Multiple Unit Composition
Syncarpathic theory assumes the multiunit composition of the international
16 Ibid., 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.
17 Hughes, 47-48, 53.
18 Goldxnann, 27, 28.
‘ Hughes, 352-354, 369.
20 Kegley and Raymond, 34-3 5.
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system within the context of general state rationality. The state units forming the base of
the system include both the nation-state and artificial multinational state of which both
are rational actors based on their pursuit of their own interests. Most states in the Global
South characteristically fall within the description of the artificial multinational state as
opposed to functional nation-states. The functioning of their institutions and behavioral
outputs differ greatly from the functional nation-states primarily occupying the Global
North. The founding of behavioral generalizations solely on any one form of state unit
will necessarily lead to inaccurate and poorly descriptive conclusions of the other. Such
an act will distort the basic consistency of the “system-unit structure of the international
system upon which IR theory is built.2’ Therefore, by necessity either two sets of
generalizations must be introduced, or the most dominant similar characteristics of both
types of state must be presented as the features of the state. Within this study the first
option has been opted for in order to elaborate on the characteristic structure and
functioning of both types of state and how those differences affect their behavior and
relations.
The State
Syncarpathic Theory conceives of the state as a multilayered ecosocial and
political organism structured minimally to comprise a geographically bounded territory,
population, governing system, economic system, material culture system/set, and
language systemlset. It is the base unit of the international system carrying the most
imfluence and is the platform from which most other actors in the system act. The state is
21 Meehan, 57-58.
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formally defmed as the sovereign political entity organizing and governing a defined
national territory and the population within it. It is politically organized under a
sovereign governing authority accepted nationally and internationally as the supreme
authority over the state. The state and its governing authorities derive their legitimacy
and sovereign authority from their citizenry, the international system, or both. It is
diplomatically recognized by other states and international institutions who acknowledge
its territorial borders and governing authorities.22 States are generally rational actors in
their behavior and relations based on the pursuit of their own self interest.23 In the twenty
first century, the state units of the system include both the nation-state and a second form
of state24 here referred to as “the artificial multinational state.” Each state houses its own
set of characteristics and behavioral responses to the system and international
environment.
Within the hierarchical anarchy state of the international system, the state must
employ any strategy available to it by which to ensure its survival. State survival is a
systematic and rational process of negating or minimalizing the failure of national
institutions and collapse of state structures by both internal and external elements. The
state must prevent its destruction through the dissolution of its territorial integrity by
military conflict, the natural environment, or structural collapse from internal and
external sociopolitical and economic pressures. The national interest of the state pursued
through its foreign policy and international relations must have at its base the goal of
Goldstein,1O.
23 Goldstein, 68-69, 102-103.
24 [bid, 10—11.
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state survival which may be achieved through enhancing state power and influence,
expanding state material capabilities, participating in international institutions, economic
or political integration, institutional restructuring, establishing strategic alliances, force
via large scale military conflict, among a grand host of means. The identification of the
base goal of the state as survival necessarily suggests that the international relations of
the state must revolve around fostering external relationships that will contribute to the
maintenance of the state’s integrity.
The Nation-State
The nation-state refers to a state where the national group identification of its
population (nation) approximates the territorial boundaries of the state.25 Within this
form of state, national identification and allegiance to an overarching state national
identity take primacy over other forms of social identifications such as ethnicity, race,
religion, and culture. The nation-state may be multinational or multiethnic in
composition where the population chooses first to collectively identify with the national
identity over allegiances and loyalties to other forms of social and national identity.26
The functional nation-state’s allegiance to an overarching national identity and agreed
societal norms of behavior and political process have historically allowed for great civil
stability, economic growth, development, and a genuine pursuit of a truly national
interest. Functional nation-states categorically engender great degrees of sovereignty and
the internal means by which to maintain that sovereignty and are largely found in the first
25Ibid, 10.
26 Nana Poku, “Colonialism and Sub-Saharan Identities” Identities in International Relations, Jill
Krause and Neil Renwick, ed. (London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1996), 180-181.
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and second tiers of states within the global north.27
The Artificial Multinational State
In contrast to the general conventional assumption that the nation-state forms the
central base unit of the system,28 this study assumes the greater numerical proliferation of
a significant second state formation existing and acting within the international system.29
This second state unit is referred to as the Artificial Multinational State.3° The artificial
multinational state is one in which multiple national groups or nations inhabit the
boundaries of the state, embracing and maintaining loyalties to social identifications of
ethnicity, race, religion, and culture over the embrace of an overarching national identity.
The designation of this form of state as artificial is derived from its historical emergence
out of European imperialism and colonization (or other forms of colonialism) of groups
of non-European peoples. These states became theoretically independent states in the
19th and 20th centuries. Most artificial multinational states through the process of
colonialism have externally imposed multinational, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious
population compositions and are mostly located in the third tier of states.3’
Artificial multinational states have generally been characterized by domestic
group insecurity, ethno-racial and religious interpretation and determination of the
national interest, extracontinental maintenance of territorial and political sovereignty, and
27 Goldstein, 10-11, 78-81.
28 Kegley and Raymond, 54.
29Goklstein, 10-11.
30 Note: This term and its definition have been introduced by the researcher.
31 Ibid., 10—11.
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soft sovereignty regimes.32 These characteristics have contributed to a host of challenges
endemic to the states of the Global South such as political instability, civil conflict, and
institutional corruption.33 Very few artificial multinational states have been able to
develop the political tools and mechanisms in the long term to absorb, ameliorate, and
resolve the complexity of the issues arising out of the structure and history of this type of
state. States such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa have with some level of
success, addressed these problems in such a manner as to allow for long term political,
civil, and economic growth and stability.34 However, the majority of artificial
multinational states have not successfully developed the sociopolitical mechanisms
necessary to mitigate or insulate against the effects of its multinational composition and
resulting multinationalisms. The structure of the artificial multinational state creates
sociopolitical and economic conditions that serve to foster excessive degrees of substate
nationalism within the state.35 Within these excessive degrees of sub-state nationalism,
individual identifications and allegiances within the state are first to identities of culture,
ethnicity, race, or religion over a unitary national identification and allegiance to the
state.36 Excessive degrees of multinationalism within the artificial multinational state in
turn foster unstable levels of group insecurity within the state based on assumed zero sum
32 Most artificial multi-national states characteristically fall into the category of lesser developed
countries/states occupying the “Third World” or “Global South” consistent with the sociopolitical and
economic behavior and outcomes of those of those categories. Hughes, 346-347.





interpretations of socioeconomic and political security.37 Within environments of
extreme imagined or real resource scarcity and institutional weakness, the level of group
insecurity becomes greatly exacerbated leading to extreme responses in the state’s
domestic and international behavior.
Domestic Group Insecurity
Unstable levels of national group insecurity in the state are reflective of an active
and ongoing Domestic Group Security Dilemma within its boundaries.38 The Domestic
Group Security Dilemma refers to the zero sum interpretation of the sociopolitical,
economic, and military gains of one national group as a decrease in the sociopolitical and
economic security of other competing groups in the state. This circumstance of
perception within the artificial multinational state is an outgrowth of its colonial history
in which the colonial state was built and maintained on forced population inclusion,
integration, group disempowerment, and subordination to a central authority.39 This
arrangement was structured to order colonial society in such a manner as to allow for the
effective administration and ongoing subordination of all native groups within the colony
to a central foreign minority authority.40
Contemporarily, without strong central institutions or external mediators to
guarantee egalitarian group security within the artificial multi-national state, modern
ibid., 185.
38 This term has been quoted by the researcher to describe the application of the international Security




Western political institutions function to reinforce domestic insecurity among national
groups.4’ As a result, it has become common place for individual or multiple groups to
seek external or international support to strengthen their position within the state.42
Within this insecure environment, the government as the primary instrument for
establishing and maintaining externallinternational relationships is perceived as the
central instrument within the artificial multinational state to enhance individual group
security relative to all other groups.43 This interpreted role of government teamed with
real and imagined perceptions of limited resource access, and historical group
incompatibility, results in the zero sum competition within the state for control over its
governing instruments and resources. The political process is reduced to a competition of
absolute gains and losses between national groups for control of the instruments of
political power that guarantee group security through unfettered access to national and
international resources. These absolute gains and losses become extremely important in
subnational group behavior when faced with the very real prospects of economic
marginalization, military suppression, and genocide via military force by those in control
of the state. At present, these processes dominate the governing process of most artificial
multinational states in the third tier in difference to conventional modem conceptions of
government. The zero sum game of domestic politics serves as the instrument and tool
by which to settle societal disputes, ensure group security, and distribute national wealth
41 Ibid., 184-185, 188.
42 Letitia Lawson and Donald Rothchild, “Sovereignty Reconsidered” Current History vol. 104, no. 682




and income within the state.
National Interest in the Artificial Multinational State
Based on the politics growing out of the domestic group security dilemma within
the artificial multinational state, the pursuit of the national interest is reduced to the
security considerations of the those groups controlling the state rather than a collusion of
competing domestic interests. This occurs in the absence of effective political
instruments and institutions by which to build and establish a national consensus among
competing groups on the composition of interests and objectives to be pursued by the
state in the international environment. Foreign policy and international relations become
reflective of the domestic group security dilemma dominating the politics of the state.
The pursuit of individual group interest via international means reinforces the
environment of insecurity as participating groups perceive the pursuit of those interests
by the governing elite as undermining the meeting of their own interests. Faced with an
overwhelmingly powerful state ruling group, nonruling groups may abandon political
processes in favor of force or autonomy seeking, establishing their own substate or non-
state foreign policy interests and relations.
Artificial and Soft Sovereignty
The third dominant characteristic of the artificial multinational state is its
artificiality and soft structure. The modern state system is founded on the principle of
state sovereignty and theoretically functions by the dictates of that regime. State
sovereignty referring to the ability and capacity of the state to control, maintain, and
protect its territorial integrity and national boarders while maintaining internal order,
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stability, physical security, and essential material security for its population.45 A state’s
sovereignty is legitimized essentially by three dominant factors: first, by its ability to act
out all aspects of its sovereign responsibilities to a degree capable of maintaining its
structural and territorial integrity, second, by the conferring of ultimate governing
authority over its territory and inhabitants to governing officials by the population, and
last, by the recognition of other states and international institutions in the international
system.46 The majority of functional nation states of the first and second tier of states
engender large degrees of sovereignty which contribute to their ongoing stability.
However, the larger percentages of artificial multinational states in the third tier of
states do not engender or practice state sovereignty according to conventional definitions
and descriptions of state sovereignty. These states have historically been unable to
maintain or act out all aspects of their sovereignty within an acceptable degree of
effectiveness as compared to the system’s fully sovereign states.47 Rather, most artificial
multinational states may instead be described as adhering to regimes ofArtjficial and Soft
Sovereignty. Within this regime ofArtificial Sovereignty, the state’s territorial
composition and borders have essentially been determined by or in relationship to the
former colonial powers of Europe and the Middle East and are maintained by
international conventions and agreements regionally and through the United Nations.48
Goldstein, 74, 76.
46 Christopher Rudolph, “Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age” International Studies




However, due to general inability of third tier states to practically perform all aspects of
their sovereign responsibilities to a functional degree, they consequently must rely on
international assistance to meet their sovereign obligations. As such, the state’s
sovereignty and very existence are largely derived and legitimized by external elements
rather than internal elements. Without the internal means by which to maintain the
sovereignty of the state, external actors effectively grant the state’s governing officials
and offices the sovereign authority to govern the state and manage its international
relationships.49 The historical background of this artificial sovereignty regime is rooted
in the artificial state’s transition from colonialism to independence, where even though
theoretically independent, it did not have the practical means to fully exercise sovereign
authority over its territory and population.5°
Artificial sovereignty regimes have had a host of historical problems contributing
to the challenges of state building in the artificial multinational states. These include
limited or absent popular political legitimacy, irredentism, civil instability, and
international aid dependency.51 Within the limits of artificial sovereignty regimes, the
practical application and implementation of state sovereignty is soft or lightly
administered relative to the hard applications of fully sovereign states. As such, soft
sovereignty may be described as the limited or marginal application and execution of the




52 This definition is introduced by the researcher.
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weakness and institutional inefficiency of weak states restricts their ability to fully
employ their internal resources toward fully meeting their sovereign responsibilities.53
The state cannot by itself effectively control and protect its territorial integrity and
national borders, ensure internal domestic security, provide for domestic social and
political order, facilitate economic stability, or ensure the essential material security of its
population. Weak states, most of which are in the third tier of states, are unable to
undertake all of these roles simultaneously or individually to a practically effective
degree. This is in contrast to the hard applications and executions of fully sovereign
states in carrying out their sovereign responsibilities.
The State: Complex Coexistence and Transition
The nation-state and artificial multinational state exist in a continually frictional
relationship as nation-states dominate the international system even though numerically
outnumbered by artificial multinational states. This friction is institutionally evident in
the structure of the United Nations system as the Security Council’s (15 members) power
and authority outweigh that of the General Assembly (all other members), and the
diffusion of economic power towards the minority of states in the Global North as
evidenced in the breakdown of World Trade Organization negotiations due to Global
South state opposition.54 The nation-states of the global North account for the bulk of
international economic activity and resource consumption, generally enjoying higher
standards of living. Most artificial multinational states largely occupying the Global
Lawson and Rothchild, 230.
Goldstein, 262, 265-267, 329-321.
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South are not industrialized with generally lower standards of living. They consume
significantly smaller percentages of global resources and account for a significantly
smaller portion of international economic and political activity in the international
system55 In its current structure, the internal system facilitates a system of cyclical
dependency56in which most artificial multinational states have historically been
economically dependent on functional nation-states and carry only 20% of global income
though accounting for 80% of its populations. The possibility of structural transition
from the artificial multinational state to the nation remains questionable, particularly as a
means by which to alleviate the problems posed by state artificiality, multinationalism,
and soft sovereignty.




BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS AND POLICY OUTPUTS
Realist Factors
The realist factors in African state behavior and relations are those influences
centering on conflict and its amelioration in the absence of a global government by which
to order the international environment and the actor relations within it. Its behavioral
variants include power, national interest, material capability, and structure.
National Interest
State resources and power ideally are not used randomly without direction and
purpose, but directed and employed specifically towards meeting the specific national
interests of the state. The core interests of the state ideally include maintaining and
protecting its territorial integrity, population, and sovereignty authority; while its
instrumental interests theoretically include enhancing or maintaining its economic and
military capabilities and power.1 It is the pursuit of its interest that leads the state to
establish and maintain specific international relationships and act out select behaviors
relative to other actors. However, there are significant challenges to state decision
makers in deciding what actions are required and necessary in the pursuit of which
interests. State decision makers must make complex short term and long term




value placed on select interests.2
Power: The International Instrument of Action
Power is the ability of a first actor to make a second actor take an action they
otherwise would not have taken without the influence of the first actor. The exercise and
calculation of power in its multivariant forms is one of the core active element upon
which state relations. Power in any of its soft or hard forms enacted through various
political instruments is an enabler of political, social, economic activity towards
cooperation or conflict in the international environment.3 Realists emphasize the role of
hard power in its military form as the ultimate instrument of resolving conflict and
achieving cooperation within a system of anarchy. Liberal cooperation through
institutionalism and interdependency are reliant on the soft power of dominant state
actors to maintain a liberal global economic system of order. The maintenance of a
politically hierarchical and economically stratified international system of states requires
both the application of soft and hard power. States seek to maximize the cumulative sum
of their power as a means by which to enhance their influence and ability to act within
the system. States seek and utilize power and as a means to influence the structure of
international order in a manner amenable to meeting and maximizing their interests.4
Within the international environment power is not contained in a vacuum between states
and historically has been directed into the pursuit of state interests (national interest),







International relations may also be attributed in part to ongoing struggles to
establish regional balances of power that create security frameworks amenable to the
interests of the actors within the region based on the diffusion of state power. Balances
of power refer to the concept of state power being used to balance the power of another
state or a group of states.5 Considerations in balance of power systems are national
interests, national security, military capabilities, material capabilities, geo-strategic
military and political concerns, and geography. The enhancing of state material
capabilities as well as alliance building have been effective means of creating balances of
power regionally or globally. Effective balance of power systems adequately provide for
the security concerns and needs of each state and result in long term stability by limiting
the contours of conflict.6
However, formal balance of power systems are limited in their effectiveness to
cooperation of states in the region or sub-region. Each actor’s cooperation is based on a
rational calculation of the benefits and costs of cooperation and participation versus
defection. State perception of the international environment and understanding of the
distribution of capabilities across the system relative to its own power dramatically affect
its ability to rationally calculate its alternatives. Without a constant flow of accurate
infonnation about competing states, the state will have to act on the unitary rational
Goldstein, 77-78.
6 Ibid., 48, 124-126.
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assumptions most likely to guarantee its security.7
Balances of power not inclusive of the most powerful states in the region or sub
region do not necessarily mitigate conflict as outlying states are not bound by those rules
and may not adhere to them. As a result, states may have incentives to act outside of
established frameworks to ensure their security. Further, states for varying reasons may
choose not to act to balance the power of other states, but may instead jump on the
bandwagon of aggressive states seeking to alter the current balance ofpower.8 Bipolarity
and even multipolarity have great potential to deadlock the active capacity of institutions
and regimes where major actors cannot come to agreement. Balance of power systems
do not conceive of alternative means to power via the threat of force as a means by which
to achieve a system of peace and order. Within a balance of power system, force and its
threat is the only means by which to punish actors acting outside of the system’s rules.9
Balance of power politics practically plays itself out in a number of security enhancing
behaviors including spheres of influence, balancing, and bandwagonning.
Spheres of Influence
Within balance of power systems competing states may establish formal or
informally recognized spheres of influence. Along with power and geographic
proximity, spheres of influence may be assumed based on historical relationships, race
and ethnicity, and cultural association. Formalized spheres of influence established in




concerts or treaties are intended to mitigate or minimize conflict through mutual
recognition of the power and influence of a given actor or actors over a defined territorial
space.’° Informal spheres of influence are based on a rational calculation and projection
of state power militarily in the absence of a consistent flow of information and
communication.
However, concerts and treaty systems may represent a fragile balance of power
system due to its lack of incentives for political cooperation relative to increases in state
power and a system of alliances. A state may seek to expand their sphere of influence or
increase its territory based on a rational calculation of the diffusion of power among
actors beyond the obligations of any treaty or regime. Calculated expansions of state
influence based solely on power the form of force then leail to states utilizing it to meet
their interests.
Balancing Behavior
When faced with the potential or real threat of a significantly more powerflul
regional or sub-regional actor, weaker states will seek to balance out the power,
influence, and capabilities of the stronger state.” The foundational principles of
balancing behavior suggest that the more powerful the state, the greater the threat
perception and insecurity of its regional neighbors; and the farther away the potentially
threatening state, the greater the likelihood of states to take steps to balance its power.’2
‘° Ibid., 222-223.
“Stephen M. Walt, Origins ofAlliances (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17-21.
12 Ibid., 27-32.
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Those states may form a larger competing unit through political, economic, and security
agreements or alliances with one another. Balancing may be accomplished unilaterally,
bilaterally, multilaterally, organizationally or institutionally through diplomatic action,
treaties, international regimes, financial censure, containment, and deterrence.’3 States
may dramatically increase their own arms (deterrence) or voluntarily participate in the
reduction of their security apparatus (arms control and reductions) based rational self
calculations such as mutually assured destruction or detente. States may also seek to
utilize international or regional institutions and organizations in which most or all of the
regional actors participate to bind or check the power and actions of a threatening state.
The ultimate balancing option available to the state is the reduction of the threatening
state’s material capabilities and security apparatus through military action. Through
force (warfare) a state may neutralize a neighboring state’s ability to act in any significant
fashion by destroying it partially or completely. 14
Bandwagonning Behaviors
State behavioral responses in seeking to achieve or maintain regional and sub
regional security necessarily changes when a more powerful potentially threatening state
is in close proximity to that state. Relatively weak states when faced with a more
powerful and potentially threatening state actor closely proximated to their borders will
likely display a form of bandwagonning behavior.’5 The foundational principles of




bandwagonning behavior suggest that the closer the threatening state to a relatively weak
state, the greater the threat perception and the greater the likelihood of the weaker state
cooperating. Likewise, the farther away the threatening state, the lesser the threat
perception of its activities. Given the greater distance, weaker states will be less likely to
cooperate and more likely to exhibit balancing behaviors.’6 The potential or real security
threat may be of both a military or economic nature.
Bandwagonning behaviors are characterized by the cooperation of the weaker
state with the more powerful state actor in order to maintain their security and survival.
The weaker state may accede or submit to annexation or becoming a participant in
political, economic, and security alliances and agreements with the threatening or
potentially threatening state.17 They may grant unconditional political and diplomatic
support to the stronger state in international or regional institutions and organizations
such as the United Nations and African Union, or ally with the stronger state in an
interstate or regional conflict. This cooperation is undertaken if necessary even at the
expense of select segments of the bandwagonning state’s national interests and alliances,
or the compromise of a third states’ security and integrity.
Structural
Structuralism also serves as a formal means of managing regional and sub
regional balances of power between states by creating parameters and limits within the




parameters and limits of the system create high levels of predictability in state behavior
within a competitive environment.18 Formalizing the distribution of capabilities and the
parameters of their use within the system serve as a means by which to establish formal
security regimes, manage hegemonic power, manage international conflict, manage arms
increases, establish communication and information sharing, and structurally allow for
relative increases in state power without conflict. The North Atlanta Treaty Organization
(NATO), and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), along with a number
of regional and sub-regional organizations and regimes across the globe structurally set
parameters for the exercise of state power.
Material Capability
The power available to the state is practically expressed or understood in terms of
material capabilities or the sum total of tangible and intangible resources the state may
employee in pursuing its national interests.19 The state’s material capabilities are
themselves largely the outgrowth of the state’s sociocultural makeup, political and
physical structure, geography, military, natural resource endowment, physical
environment, and population factors.2° The distribution of capabilities across the
international system determines its structure and the relationship of the units to each
other.2’ State material capability in turn informs the power position of the state within
the international system and determines its capacity to interact with other state and non
18 Hughes, 53.
‘ Waltz, 87-89.
20 Ibid., 80, 84-85.
‘ Ibid.
104
state actors. The greater the state’s material capabilities, the greater the options available
to it, to act within the system. Conversely, the lesser the state material capabilities, the
less the alternatives available to the state in managing its international relationships and
the lower its power position within the international system.
Liberal Factors
The liberal factors in African state behavior and relations are those influences
centering on cooperation and global governance in the absence of a global government to
order the international environment and state behavior and relations. Its corresponding
behavioral variants include international institutionalism, complex interdependence,
globalization, and international aid regimes.
International Institutionalism
International institutionalism suggests that international order through cooperation
may be achieved by institutionalizing behavioral norms and rules through
intergovernmental and financial institutions as prerequisite for systemic participation.
Institutions contribute to state behavior by systematically structuring choices, providing
incentives, distributing power, and defming identities and roles within the international
system.22 International institutionalism is housed on the principle of absolute gains for
state actors as opposed to relative gains providing a framework for mutual wins in state
relations as opposed a zero sum political game.23 Rationality among actors is achieved




participation are greater than not cooperating (defection) relative to the state’s national
interests.24 Punishment for not adhering to international standards and rules of behavior
are meted out organizationally in the form of limited or restricted participation and force
if authorized.
The contemporary international system is institutionally organized to provide an
accessible medium of communication and mediation for states to resolve conflicts and
build cooperation. International institutions provide a steady source of information
regarding actor behavior through institutional norms negating the need for rational actors
to base their relations with other actors purely on assumed unitary rationality. Actors can
instead base their relations with other actors on agreed institutional principles and rules of
behavior and interaction. Institutionalism helps to dispel the security concerns of actors
outside of the system and provides incentives for both domestic and international
behavior changes by addressing the same rules to all participants. International
institutionalism is a part of the evolving efforts of the modern state system to achieve
global governance in the absence of a global government.25
At present, the contemporary international system’s institutions and organizations
are divided into both political and financial organizations. However, these international
political and financial organizations are hierarchically structured and economically
stratified according to state power, material capability, class, civilization, ethnicity, race,
religion, and ideology among other factors. The United Nations system forms the
24Goldstein, 102-103, 105.
25 Ibid, 109, 256-259
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political segment, while the Brettoñ Woods institutions and the World Trade
Organization form the financial and economic segment of the system.26 The primary
decision making bodies within the United Nations are the Security Council and General
Assembly while the Bretton Woods institutions are comprised of the international
Monetary Fund and World Bank. The World Trade Organization is the institution
responsible for managing and enhancing global trade and trade regimes.
Regionalism
Institutionalism has diffused from the global political and fmancial regimes to
regional and sub-regional forms of organization. This diffusion of international
institutionalism by region has become known as regionalism in which multiple states in
close or similar geographic proximity formally organize to address their collective
political and economic needs. States act in concert to address issues more effectively
than they have the capacity to effectively address themselves. Regional integration, the
formalized organization and cooperation of states in a given region into an institutional
body to achieve collectively desired political and economic goals, has become a staunch
facet of the international system.27 In varying regions across the globe regional
institutionalism has been used by the state to amplify or magnify its power while
restricting the power of more powerful states without engaging in a military conflict.
This is accomplished through collective security regimes, economic agreements, and
institutional management of regional conflicts. The diffusing of the responsibilities of
26 Ibid., 259-260, 327-329, 351-353.
Kegley and Raymond, 262-263.
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the maintenance of peace and security to neighboring states reduces the likelihood of
escalating conflict between member states and lightens the burden of any one state
having to solely maintain their own security.28 The impetus for such actions include
regional political stability, economics and trade, collective security, and conflict
management.
Globalization
The post-Cold War world of the 1990s has seen the rapid expansion and
development of capitalism into every region of the world. The dissolution of the Soviet
Union and its competing globalized system of state sponsored communism and socialism
allowed for the full global extension and open participation in capitalism by all of the
world states. The global economy has become firmly established on liberal trade in
global and national markets within a systemic environment of productive competition
between state actors and non-state actors. The unipolar international system has
facilitated the full participation in the global economy of the world’s largest and
potentially most promising regional economies including China, Russia, India, Brazil,
Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa. The production of goods and services is now diffused
across the globe as the capital and resources necessary for the production process
gravitates to those areas promising the most efficient return. The component parts of
consumer and capital goods and services may be produced in any number of states,
assembled in another, and sold in yet another. The net result of these collective processes
has been a form of global competition for raw materials, production centers, and efficient
skilled and unskilled labor that have unleashed a period of global economic growth
28 Ibid., 255-256, 258-260, 316-317.
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unprecedented in the world’s history.
The behavior and relations of state are increasingly defined by the neo-liberal
order of global economics and trade and the politics of interdependency that govern it.
This evolving political phenomenon referred to as globalization characteristically
includes rapid technological advances in communications and information technology,
highly efficient and globally available transportation services, the global liquidity and
rapid movement of capital, a globally competitive labor market, state level competition to
host production centers, the global diffusion of media, the internationalization of crime
syndicates, unparalleled environmental destruction, and the development of paralleling
socio-political and fmancial institutions by which to govern it. The diffusion of
production is presently structured in such a manner that a given product may have
component parts manufactured in different states, assembled in another state, shipped
from a third state, and marketed and purchased in several other states. The behavior and
relations of the state are in part characterized by an ongoing process of establishing and
maintaining relationships that elevate the state’s position within the production value
chain of the global economy. The state actively engages in this process while
synonymously positioning itself to benefit from the production and position of other
competing states in the system.3° States within the system are engaged in both a formal
and informal process of seeking to manage globalization’s different aspects towards
reaping its benefits nationally, and negating its negative domestic effects. State actors are




globalization’s outcomes in their interest.
Globalization in its first phase emerged as a byproduct of technological advances
in information technology, telecommunications, and transportation, allowing for truly
global transactions and interactions on a scale unprecedented in human history. The
rapid diffusion these technological advances globally served to facilitate the enhanced
movement of capital and resources to and from major world centers of economic activity
and the development of new centers of activity. The new international liquidity of capital
empowered by rapid communications exchanges and the efficiency of modem
transportation services, has allowed capital and production to flow rapidly and more
easily to the most efficient centers of production and extraction at the most affordable
cost. This process enables end products to be distributed through global markets from the
most profitable industrial states to the most remote locations in the world. The speedy
movement of global capital continually facilitates more efficient and accessible
production processes that fuel human innovation and drive the world technologically
forward.
Globalization has brought about a true global division of labor and production in
the production of goods and services reaching every region of the globe. Global
competition in the labor market has created an environment where states and workers
alike compete with other states and workers to house production centers and supply the
necessary labor for the production process. Education is a central factor in the
competition as non-skilled workers with elementary, secondary, and tertiary level
educations are necessary to house the areas of production highest on the global value
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chain. In the states benefiting most greatly from the globalization process laborers have
efficient transportation mechanisms to and from residential areas to commercial centers.
Large and significant percentages of their working population are generally in good
health with adequate access to nutritious food, clean water, and healthcare service. The
states benefiting the least from globalization generally do not house these factors in great
degrees.3’
Global marketing and international demand have also become key components of
globalization with a standardization of select goods and services such as automobiles, cell
phone technology, internet services, and medical technology. The advent of the internet,
the cell phone, and satellite technology has served to dramatically increase interstate and
individual communication and distribution of ideas, marketing, and media across the
globe. As a result, there has been a global diffusion of ideas to every corner of the world
with corresponding societal and consumer demands.32 Globalization has also brought
with it concern and discussion on the long term effects of environmental damage to the
planet. The continual evolution of global governance and establishing of international
regimes for protection of the environment has been a significant factor in international
relations impacting the long term development goal and planning of numerous states.
The industrialization and potential industrialization of the world’s most populous states
will limit the amount of available resources in the natural environment as well as
significantly increase the level of industrial and consumer pollution to possibly crisis
levels. The preservation of the environments of non- industrialized spaces is of great
Kegley and Riymond, 283-287.
32 Ibid., 272-274.
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concern to international environmentalists as a means toward preserving the world
environment.33
Increasing global interaction of human beings through expanding travel,
expanding migration flows, the internationalization of the labor, educational exchanges,
and expanding global tourism have fueled growing concerns in international and national
health organizations such as the World Health Organization and Centers for Disease
Control about global control mechanisms towards limiting the spread of disease. Among
nonindustrialized states generally limited levels of sanitation and access to clean water or
health care and immunizations all serve to increase the prospects for the outbreak and
likelihood of disease nationally, regionally, and globally.34 Further, globalization has
also enhanced the ability of terrorist groups, international freedom fighters, and
international crime syndicates to form and organize themselves in, and in-between states.
They now have increased capacity to move capital and resources throughout the world to
achieve their desired goals.
Complex Interdependence
The physical, economic, transportation and communications changes wrought by
globalization have been accompanied by correlating socio-political developments in the
system, state, state relations, and international institutions and organizations. The
interconnectedness of the global economy has created a state of global interdependency
necessitating regimes to govern the interactions between both state and non-state actors.




formal and informal relationships between states as well as states and non-state actors
cross multiple channels necessary for the functioning of multiple actors.35 This level of
interdependence refers not only to the economic and political interdependence of
powerful and wealthy states, but also to the interdependency of center and periphery
states on each other for international markets for raw materials, labor, production centers,
consumer goods and services, and consumers.36
This systemic condition has simplified yet complicated the relations between
powerful and wealthy states as military conflict as a means to settle state disputes serves
to obstruct production and necessary relationships on a regional and global level.37 All
states’ governing bodies are constantly seeking to cope with the challenges of complex
interdependency and globalization which are global level phenomena whereas their state
instruments that are national in nature. The governing elements of the state are
constantly deciding how to conduct their international relationships to cope with the
rapidity of global changes in manner amenable to their interests. Complex political and
institutional management of those relationships in the global economy and international
system are presently required to mediate and settle state disputes in maintaining
cooperation and averting conflict. Even so, complex interdependence poses a host of
challenges in achieving consensus on solutions to solving both state and interstate
problems.
Hughes, 242-243.
36 R. J. Bany Jones, Globalization and Interdependence in the International Political Economy:
Rhetoric and Reality (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 94-95.
Jones, 213.
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First, the interconnectedness of the global economy through national economies
continually houses the possibility that the political or economic disruption of one national
economy will likely adversely affects other economies, governments, and institutions to
which it is interlinked. Therefore, state security concerns necessarily revolve around the
maintenance of regional political and economic stability to allow for the continual growth
of economic output and productive interstate relations.38 Second, neither complex
interdependency nor globalization has resulted in an equilateral or egalitarian distribution
of economic benefits between the center and periphery. The benefits have been slanted
firmly in the favor of the states of the Global North widening the development gap
between it and the states of the Global South.39 Complex interdependency is increasingly
problematic for weaker and less influential states as center states utilize international
institutionalism and economic stratification as a means to maintain the structure of global
production processes facilitating the inequitable distribution of global wealth and income.
° Complex interdependency greatly complicates the ability of the periphery state to
increase their level of global economic and political participation towards moving up the
in the global production value chain.
Complex interdependency begs the question as to how the benefits of
globalization will be distributed as well as to how its ills will be mitigated. At present the
benefits of globalization in terms of growth and development lean heavily towards those





drive and facilitate the process. However, those states in the periphery receiving the least
benefits bear the brunt of its ills in terms of socio-political fallouts and are also recipients
of global level environmental degradation they do produce. Atmospheric pollution and
global warming generated in the center states of the global north and semi-periphery are
consequences bore by the global South states of the periphery even though they do not
reap the greater portion of the benefits from the processes creating it.41
International Aid Regimes
International aid regimes have become a key and defining facet in the behavior
and relations of the third tier of states to which most Sub-Saharan African states
categorically fall. More than 90% of all development and humanitarian aid to poor
Global South states is provided by the wealthy states of the Global North and select semi-
periphery states (North America, Western Europe, Japan, and China).42 International aid
theoretically serves as a means by which to develop the state through enhancing its
material capabilities, functionalizing the state structure, strengthening societal
institutions, and aid in the creation of an environment conducive to political stability.
However, when not strategically and meaningfully applied aid regimes have been
counterproductive effectively bolstering ethnic and class divisions, militarizing the state,




‘3Percy S. Mistry, “Reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development Deficit” African Affairs, no.
104/4 17 (2005) : 666, 677.
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Within the third tier of states international aid regimes have generally led to the
development of international relationships centered on debt accumulation that
subordinate debtor states to the dictates and interests of aid providers. The manner in
which international aid has been distributed in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
America, and South Asia have not directed the assistance to the key areas that most
significantly enhance the capabilities and institutions of the state. Aid packages have not
served to alleviate state structural handicaps nor eliminate the systemic handicaps weak
states face within the international system. Aid in both the Cold War and post-Cold War
period have not focused on national economic and social development, but have included
disproportionate amounts of military aid, industrial oil and mineral extraction equipment,
and personal political aggrandizement and corruption.45 The ultimate outcome of
Western aid packages to third tier states have been the mass accumulation of large-scale
debt46 which in turn have facilitated an ongoing cycle of subordination, dependency, and
underdevelopment among recipients states.
International aid packages have encountered the challenges of absorptive capacity
in donor states, and the immoral or self-interested conditionalities of donor states.
African and other states often have severely limited structural and moral capacities by
which to receive and productively implement aid. Donor states often attach self serving
conditions and applications to aid resulting ultimately in a hire cost to the recipient state.
Liberal international aid packages to poor nonindustrialized states have served both as a
‘Ibid,670.
Stephen Williams, “Justice for Africa” African Business (AugustlSeptember 2005): 16.
thid., 17.
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tool by which politicians ingratiate themselves domestically, and as a tool of wealthy
countries to maintain the hierarchical and stratified structure of the global economic and
political system. In practical terms, aid packages have directed assistance primarily to
infrastructural support of existing extraction and distribution centers, debt servicing and
forgiveness, budget support, and military aid.
International aid regimes are also part of a system wide economic and political
process that serves to continually undermine the position of weak global south states in
the third tier of states in a manner that contributes to their underdevelopment and keeps
them cyclically dependent.48 Those same processes act to maintain the position of
developed industrialized states atop of the global hierarchy of states enhancing their
national development. The global system is politically and economically structured to
create and perpetuate the conditions and relationships that require African and other poor
states to seek international aid in the first instance.
Within the production value chain of the global economic system and its
paralleling global division of labor and production, third tier states have been limited to
the lowest level of production providing primary agricultural and mineral goods. Primary
resource extraction and production yield the lowest value and generate the smallest
amount of income and revenue in the production value chain and are absolutely vital to
the higher level production processes of developed and developing states. Secondary and
tertiary production processes in contrast yield the greatest value and revenue in the global
“ Jagdish Bhagwati, “Development Aid: Getting it Right” The OECD Observer Paris iss. 249 (May
2005) : 27-29.
Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence” The American Economic Review, vol. 60
(May 1970):231-232.
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production process and consequently engender the highest cost in their distribution on the
global market. The cumulative result of this in the structure of the production value chain
is that the primary resource exporting states receives the smallest amount of revenue for
its main exports of goods and services, but pays a disproportionately high price for the
capital and consumer goods and services produced form those resources in industrial
states.49
The dependent states in the third tier face the distinct challenge of meeting the
deficit between their limited purchasing power and meeting the fmancial obligations of
the state. To account for this deficit, the states utilize international aid assistance to meet
its daily budgetary, structural, developmental, and societal needs. In this maimer the
structure of the global economy facilitates a systematic process by which poor states are
pushed to incur large scale debt accumulation through credit and loan financing to make
up for the limitations of their national revenue base.5° The donor states of the Global
North in the first tier actively maintain the global economic system facilitating
dependency and underdevelopment which subsequently necessitates the availability of
international aid. Third tier states in the global south are systematically placed in a
position where they must seek aid from the very same state and nonstate sources that
generate the most wealth from the exploitation of their resources.
International Class Factors
International class factors in state behavior and relations describe those influences




within the international system based on global division of production and value chains,
and struggles for international institutional influence. The behavior and relations of the
state are dynamically influenced by class conflict and preferences as opposed to a solely
rational conception of the national interest, state structure, or cost benefit analysis of
institutional participation and competition between interest groups. Its corresponding
behavioral variants include class conflict, political hierarchy and economic stratification,
and institutional regulation subordination.
Class Struggle
The behavior and relations of the states are also due in part to a system wide
social and political class struggle between elite and the mass groups over control of the
state to determine the ownership and distribution of its resources. Domestically, through
control of government institutions and resources, the masses or elites are able to
determine how the accrued benefits of the production process will be distributed
throughout the state and how it will ultimately be structurally organized. Elites in each
state throughout the system ally themselves to maintain elite dominated states within the
international system.5’ They seek to control state resources and the means of production
through the state’s governing institutions to maintain their position at the top of the class
hierarchy over the masses of workers. Within the framework of international class
conflict elites also seek to dominate the international system with a corresponding
distribution of political power and economic stratification. 52
Chilcote, 284.
52 Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, Political Economy ofContemporary Africa 2” ecL
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1985), 36.
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Once it is in the interest of the maintenance of their power and position, the ruling
elites in their respective states furnish support to the ruling elites of other states in an
effort to secure the superstructure of the world system and their states position within it53
If it is outside of the interest of the maintenance of elite power positions to support a
particular state’s controlling elite, other elite groups will not grant support and likely
work towards the removal and exchange of one ruling elite in that state for another more
amenable to their interest. As a result, ruling elites in third tier states in Africa, Latin
America, and Asia receive state level support and aid from regional and extra-regional
elites in the second and third tiers of states of the center and semi-periphery. These
relationships largely play themselves out along the lines of dependency,
underdevelopment, and neocolonialism as elite support is not given freely and comes
with a price.54
The masses worldwide are theoretically in a constant struggle to wrestle control of
the state from elite groups to employ state power and resources in their interest. The
masses do not consider elite control of the state to be in their interests as elites constantly
seek to distribute state resources, the benefits of production, and the benefits of
international relationships to themselves at the expense of the livelihood and welfare of
the masses. Elites use their power position to subjugate and exploit the masses
themselves or allow the same to be done to them by external actors. The masses initially




or representative elections to place popular leaders in control of the state to act in their
interests. However, if the masses are unable to meet their objectives through democratic
process they employ force or violence towards state infrastructure, institutions, officials,
personnel, or assume control of state resources and infrastructure in revolutionary efforts
to have their interests met. Civil conflict may ensue if the masses are provided continual
access to the resources necessary to maintain ongoing action against the state and its
ruling elite.5’
However, constant efforts are made by national elites with the assistance of other
ruling elites in the system also employing elitist international organizations and
institutions to undermine popular movements in the weaker states of the system. If a
popular movement is perceived as unavoidable and its is in the interest of maintaining the
status quo to have that particular elite group removed, they will support that movement in
an effort to shape a new elite more amenable to their interest to come power out of the
masses.
Political Hierarchy and Economic Stratification
Within the post-Cold War international system, the center-periphery’6relations of
the international system have been institutionalized and regimented to govern the
relations between the first tier states of the global north and the second and third tier
states of the global south. “ Both the UN system and Bretton Woods Institutions along
Goldstein, 464.
56 Wallerstein.
r This study goes beyond Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems model of international class analysis,
suggesting that center-periphery relations have been institutionalized and regimented contemporarily in the
post Cold War international system. Both the UN system and Bretton Woods Institutions along with the
121
with the WTO are elitist instruments by which to maintain the class structure of the
international system with its corresponding political hierarchy and economic
stratification. Within the international environment there exists both a formal and
informal hierarchy among states determined by a host of factors including the
international division of labor and production, military power, economic power,
geostrategic value, population, religion, ethnicity, race, culture, and civilization.
The system of global order was established and is maintained by the most
powerful and influential states in a manner to maintain their elite positions in the system
while undermining the power and sociopolitical mobility of weaker or ascending states
that may seek to change or destabilize the system. International institutions,
organizations, and regimes are the primary instruments used to govern and maintain the
international status quota.58 The United Nations and International Financial Institutions
(1MF, World Bank) may all be considered elitist institutions with the permanent members
of the UN Security Council and their closest allies representing the elite group of states in
the system. The distribution of military power among states necessitated the
development of a hierarchy among states within an institutionalized framework that
mitigates conflict and provides for peaceful relations between those states with the
greatest military capability. The destructive potential of these states to threaten different
regions and each other raise them to the top of the hierarchy along with states essential to
the maintenance of the stability and functioning of the system. The states with the least
WTO are elitist instruments by which to maintain the class structure of the international system with its
corresponding political hierarchy and economic stratification.
58 Ikenberry, 24, 26.
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destructive capacity and least bearing on its stability and functioning are consequently
pushed down to the bottom of the hierarchy.
Both the digital divide and North-South gap59 are descriptive terms around the
stratified structure of the global economy describing the diffusion of economic and
productive capacity between first, second and third tier states. Secondary and tertiary
advanced techno-industrial processes, capital accumulation, and mass market exchange
largely reside in the global North and select states in the semi-periphery. Those
processes and goods and services yield the highest value in the global economic value
chain. Energy supplies and extraction resides largely in select second tier, and primarily
in third tier states. Energy extraction to supply the techno-industrial processes of the
center and semi-periphery yield the second highest value in the global economic value
chain. Primary resource commodity agriculture and mineral extraction reside primarily
in the peripheral third tier states of the global south yielding the lowest value on the
global economic value chain.60
Primary resource extraction and production yield the lowest value and generate
the smallest amount of income and revenue, but are vital to the higher level production
processes of developed and developing states. Secondary and tertiary production
processes in contrast yield the greatest value and revenue in the global production
process, and consequently engender the highest cost in their distribution in the global
market. The cumulative result of the stratified structure of the global economy and its
Kegley and Raymond, 107, 274.
60 Hughes, 352-355.
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production value chain is that the poorest and least influential states of the periphery
receives the smallest amount of value (revenue) for the production of their goods and
services, but pay a disproportionately high price for the capital and consumer goods and
services produced from those resources in first and second tier industrial states.
Conversely, first and select second tier states in the global north receive the highest value
for their goods and services, but with the exception of energy pay a comparatively low
price for the agro-mineral resources produced in third tier states. As a result there
develops an economic hierarchy of importance among the different tiers of states with the
first ranldng as the most important and the third as the least important.6’
The states of the upper tiers of the international hierarchy of states work to
remove or undermine ruling elites and popular leaders who seek to alter the order of the
global hierarchy of states by enhancing their state’s position through expanding state
material capabilities, enhancing state security, military conflict, and amplification of the
state’s power through international institutions. Elite actions against such state leadership
effectively discourage national leaders from taking positive actions in their states interest
that would possibly upset the status quota. As a result, in third tier states there has been a
preponderance of leadership willing to maintain the status quota at the expense of state
interests.
Institutional Regulation and Subordination
State behavior and relations are also in part shaped by the parameters imposed on
the state by the rules and regimes of international institutions and organizations in
managing the international system. Those elitist institutions and organizations impose
61 Dos Santos, 23 1-234.
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numerous regulations developed by first tier states on the weaker and less influential
states within the system which both directly and indirectly subordinate the decisions,
actions, and behaviors of the weakest states to the dictates of the system elitist controlling
elements.
The greater role of international institutionalism in the post -World War II
international system along with the onset of globalization and complex interdependency
in the post-Cold War world are responsible for the imposition of intense levels of
regulation and subordination on the weaker and less influential states.62 The intense
levels of systemic regulation over the system’s weakest states is largely rooted in their
dependence on the system’s institutions and most powerful actors for the maintenance of
their territorial integrity and daily material survival.63 In many areas this institutional
regulation goes beyond a system of sovereign participation by choice for the state, where
adherence to international rules and norms are a requirement for participation and access
to necessary and financial resources and services. The international system’s institutions
and most powerfui states take on a parallel role to governance for weak states in
regulating international economics and trade, aiding in the provision of regional and civil
security, and providing aid packages, credit, and financing.TM
Compliance with institutional and international rules and regulations is held as
perquisite and requirement for access to international financial and security instruments
necessary for economic and national security. Financial institutions such as the World
62 Hughes, 329.
63 Goldstein, 476-478.
64 Goldstein, 476-478, 522-525, 526-528.
125
Bank and IMF have evolved relationships with several states in which they essentially
take on roles paramount to national governance and policy determination in those states.
Common fiscal areas in which this occurrence is repeated are economics and trade,
domestic civil security, and the material provision of select essential goods and services
such as food provision and disease control.65 The weaker and least influential states as a
consequence of participation must answer in some degree to governing bodies of these
institutions and organizations. Weak states are placed in a subordinate position to
international institutions and powerful actors based primarily on their almost absolute
dependence on the system’s institutions and powerful state actors for their material
survival.
State Structural and Functional Factors
State structure and function factors in state behavior and relations refer to those
influences emanating out of the institutional and territorial organization of the state as a
national and domestic conduit for sociopolitical inputs and outputs.66 Its corresponding
variants include structural and functional independence and dependence, structural
institutionalism and institutional inertia, structural penetration, structural
underdevelopment, and institutional failure and structural collapse. The behavior and
relations of the state are in part a product of the degree to which the state is able to
functionalize its political, economic, territorial, and social structures towards its capacity




decisions and actions available to the state not only emanate from state structural factors,
but also from the structure and functioning of the international system in its political and
economic aspects.67 The collusion of both state and systemic factors dynamically affect
the decisions and actions available to the state.
Structural and Functional Independence and Dependence
Within the contemporary international environment, states are generally
structured either to be functionally independent, able to provide for their basic needs and
wants through their own efforts, functionally dependent, largely reliant on the efforts of
other actors to provide for their basic needs and wants, or possibly some position in-
between with varying degrees of both. The necessities of states may be expressed in
terms of political stability, civil and national security, economic security, territorial
security, health security, and food security. Structural dependence and independence are
themselves the products of state institutional factors teamed with systemic factors
interacting in a manner that either hinders or enhances the state’s level of internal
organization and productivity. States often meet combined characteristics of dependence
and independence in their structure and functioning where they may be structurally
independent but dysfunctional, or structurally dependent yet functional. Other states
have no level of functionality as their structures have collapsed from institutional failure
and organizational stagnation.68
Structural and Functional Independence
67 Wallerstein, 35-36.
68 The concept of structural and functional dependence and its accompanying defmitions, concepts, and
variants have been introduced and defined by the researcher after having examined theories of statism,
structure and function, and dependency.
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Structural and functionally independent states are found primarily in the first and
upper second tiers of states within the international system. These states institutions are
organized in such a manner as to allow for the efficient use of resources towards the
provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants without external structural support.
Their political systems serve as effective societal organizing tools by which to meet the
collective interests within the state and ensure accountability and transparency in the
extraction, allocation, and distribution of resources. Examples of states of this type are
the United State, Canada, Australia, Germany, England, France Russia, Japan and China.
Structural Independence and Dysfunctionality
Structurally independent yet dysfunctional states are found in the lower first and
second tiers of states within the international system. These states institutions are
organized in such a manner as to ensure the basic employ of resources towards the
provision primarily of the essential needs of the state and its inhabitants without external
structural support. Their political systems are organized to an operational degree that
allows society to be mobilized to meet the most basic needs of the state, but not the
collective interests of its population. These states institutions are organized in a manner
that facilitates institutional inefficiency and corruption adversely affecting and the state’s
ability to comprehensively provide for itself as a fully functional entity. The political
process and governing institutions ensure only enough transparency and accountability to
enable an inefficient and limited extraction, allocation, and distribution of state resources.
The cumulative result of the institutional organization of the state is its partial and limited
functionality. However, such states have the option of seeking external assistance and
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support in areas beyond essential goods and services were deemed necessary. Examples
of such states are India, Iran, Indonesia, and South Africa.
Structural Dependence and Functionality
Structurally dependent and functional states are found primarily in the lower
second tier and upper third tier of states within the international system. Their political
systems are organized to a sufficient operational degree to work in concert with external
structural support systems to mobilize state resources to meet the basic needs of the state
and the general interests within it. However, these states institutions are organized in a
manner that facilitates significant enough degrees of institutional inefficiency and
corruption to necessitate external supports to mitigate the adverse affects of institutional
and organizational weakness. The political process and governing institutions ensure
enough transparency and accountability to secure external assistance for a functional
system of extraction, allocation, and distribution of basic and essential state resources,
goods, and services. Even though existing in a state of dependency, these states engender
an acceptable degree of functionality and theoretically are on a transitionary path to
structural independence at some point in the future. Examples of states of this type are
Ghana, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.
Structural Dependence and Dysfunctionality
Structurally dependent and dysfunctional states are found primarily in the lower
second and third tiers of states within the international system. These states institutions
are organized in a manner that hinders or negates the efficient employ of state resources
towards the provision of the needs of the state and its inhabitants. Rather than serving as
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an effective societal organizing tool, the political system enables and facilitates
institutional inefficiency and corruption without a system of rugged organizational or
institutional accountability. The process of resource extraction, allocation, and
distribution in these states is adversely affected and the state’s ability to internally
provide for itself severely compromised. The cumulative result of the institutional
organization of the states is a necessary reliance on external political and economical
structural support to maintain the structural and territorial consistency of the state.
Without external support, many states in the third tier would regress into a state of
structural collapse and institutional failure. These state’s complete reliance on external
structural support mechanism may also be referred to as a state of dependency. Examples
of states of this type are Togo and Benin.
Structural Institutionalism and Institutional Inertia
Structural institutionalism and institutional inertia also significantly impact the
behavior and relations of the state. Structural institutionalism suggests that the behavior
and decision making of the state is reflective of the organization, efficiency, and culture
of its formal and informal institutions.69 The state structurally is comprised of geographic
territory, physical infrastructure, population, and the institutions by which those four
elements are formally and informally organized and governed. Institutions are the
primary instruments for transferring culture and values as well as the practical means
through which policy is formed and enacted. Government acts as the ultimate decision
making institution with ultimate authority over societies other institutions and the state’s
69 Timothy C. Lim, Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues (Boulder,
Colorado: Lynee Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 84-86.
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geographic boundaries.
The sociopolitical and economic structures of the sate are comprised of
institutional bodies practically organized to systematically facilitate and link all societal
activity towards functionalizing the state. The most basic societal institution is the family
while the most powerful state institutions theoretically exist within the government
apparatus. The most common formal institutions are the education system, religious
bodies, the banking system, economic and financial bodies, the legislative body, the
executive body, the judicial body, public offlces/ ministries, and the military. State
decision making and policy formulation are in part shaped by and filtered through its
collective institutional bodies.7° The aggregate level of institutional culture and system
of institutional organization are in turn the primary state level determinants of the level of
independence and functionality exhibited by each state.
However, state decision making and policy formulation may be constrained by the
occurrence or development of unusually high levels of organizational rigidity and
complacency within national institutions that limit or constrain their ability to evolve to
reflect the changing needs of society and the state. This element of institutional inertia
develops when the national sociopolitical institutions of the state and its economic system
systematically reproduce specific sociopolitical and economic outputs regardless of the
type of inputs into the state and society. The institutions become rigid and dogmatic,
reinforced in their approach to addressing societal needs and wants.71
This condition is often precipitated by leadership styles and perceptions which
Ibid.
‘ Kegley and Wittkopf, 486.
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may be conservative and invested in existing institutional processes and outcomes.
Ongoing occurrences of dependency, underdevelopment, neocolonialism, debt,
corruption, poverty, and civil conflict may be assumed to be facilitated and perpetuated
by national institutions. These institutions are often sufficiently rigid that even with new
reformist leadership, tremendous influxes of international aid, favorable trade alliances
and opportunities with new non-western partners; institutional outcomes continue to be
similar reproducing essentially the same type of behaviors and relationships. As a result,
efforts towards functionalizing state behavior to produce different behavioral outputs and
outcomes likely cannot be successfully achieved without fundamentally altering,
restructuring, or reconstructing national sociopolitical and economic institutions and the
systems linking them. Institutional changes become fundamental to the process of
changing the state’s behavior and managing its international relationships.
Institutional Culture Clash
The structure and functioning of the state is dynamically affected by
incompatibilities between the institutional culture of national institutions and the political
socialization and culture of the populations utilizing and staffing them. National
institutions may suffer from an incompatibility between the values of society and those
required for national institutions to function effectively. 72 The incompatibility of societal
and national institutional values refers to the occurrence of an institutional culture clash.
Institutional culture clashes serve to minimalize the functionality and efficiency of an
institution rendering it largely ineffective and dysfunctional. The state structures of most
72 Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing
Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
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second and third tier states have been forged upon foreign socio-political and economic
institutions with paralleling institutional cultures and values foreign to those regions. The
indigenous populations of most Global South states have been dealt the task of adapting
their traditional ideas and institutions regarding political authority and process to modem
state structures in order to produce a state unit capable of effectively functioning in the
contemporary international system.73
The integration of traditional political cultures into Western and Eastern political
and economic institutions has not been perfect or seamless as the inability of the state’s
governing elements to secure an efficient mode of operation has resulted in socio
political and economic fallouts along institutional lines. The most common domestic
political fallouts of institutional culture clash in the second and third tier states of the
global south have been the zero sum interpretation of western democratic political
processes, bureaucratic inefficiency, rent seeking, nepotism, and the large scale absence
of fmancial and economic transparency referred to as corruption.74
Structural Underdevelopment
Structural underdevelopment describes a state level condition in which the state’s
level of internal organization teamed with the structure of the international system, both
systematically and haphazardly weaken its national institutions retarding their ability to
function effectively or expand to meet societal demands. The states’ level of internal
Ibid.
Alence, “Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa” Journal
ofModern African Studies, 42, 2 (2004): 166-167.
This definition has been introduced by the researcher.
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institutional organization and character of international relationships impedes its ability to
sufficiently expand its material capabilities towards providing for the basic necessities of
the state. In this condition of structural underdevelopment the states’ socio-political and
economic institutions are unable to ingest societal and international inputs and convert
them into functional outputs in a manner that allows that process to be cyclically
reproduced and expanded. State structural and institutional expansion is contingent on
socio-economic growth and development in which the aggregate generation of revenue
and increasing complexity of social networks and values enhances the ability of the state
to satisfy an increasing number societal wants and needs.
However, structurally underdeveloped states are by themselves unable to maintain
or foster their own growth and development relegating them to a subordinate position of
cyclical dependency and massive debt accumulation. Structural underdevelopment
combined with cyclical dependency and mass debt accumulation serves to fundamentally
weaken state institutions, where without external assistance, will fail and ultimately result
in the collapse of the state structure. In order to avoid such a condition, numerous states
in the lower second and third tier seek international aid and development assistance in
order to maintain the state’s structural and territorial integrity.
Structural Penetration
A structurally penetrated state may be described as a state whose structure and
institutions are compromised by the presence of external actors whose actions undermine
or impede its ability to act within its own interest. 76 The actions and activities of external
actors may substantially weaken or even supersede aspects of the state’s sovereignty. A
76 This definition has been developed by the researcher.
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structurally penetrated state’s sovereignty may be so greatly impeded upon by the
presence and actions of external actors that several of its domestic and foreign policy
decisions and behaviors cannot be discussed in isolation of those external actors. Large
enough degrees of state penetration erode the authority and legitimacy of national
institutions where they are no longer regarded as societal instruments acting in the
interest of the state and its population. External actors may even establish rival
institutions within the state carrying extra-state authority and transferring an independent
set of values and culture to the population. These alternative institutions provide an
alternate means of societal organization and material provision which further diminish
and delegitimize the role of the state before the population.
The structural penetration of the state also creates a competition between the state
population and external actors for influence over state leadership and governmental
processes. Popular influence over the states’ leadership and government is subject to
decline as the presence and influence of external actors within the state increases. The
population is placed in a falling competition with external actors over the decision
making processes of the state. As a result the population may become so disempowered
relative to external actors that they perceive social unrest and civil conflict as their only
available bargaining tools abandoning institutional processes as a means of meeting their
interest.
State reliance on foreign direct investment and international aid beholden the state
to multinational corporations, state owned companies, and aid donor states and
organizations. Economic and financial policy are subjected to IMF and World Bank
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liberal economic reforms and trade policy while domestic policy formulation remains
subject to extra continental states and businesses. States housing peace keeping and
mediation missions by international bodies and states such as the United Nations and
powerful state actors subject the domestic political process of the state to the preferences
of those actors. Nationalization has been utilized by the state as a means to repair
structural penetration by forcefully taking ownership of foreign owned businesses,
infrastructure, and resources. Delinking and isolationism from the global economic
system and its major actors has also been utilized as a second method to repair structural
penetration. The state closes its borders and doors to external actors economically and
otherwise as necessary to restore political authority and confidence in its institutions and
indigenous economic base.
Structural Collapse and Institutional Failure
State collapse and institutional failure generally occur in the third tier of states,
with possible occurrences in any state tier as a result of civil or intrastate conflict. A
structurally collapsed state may be described as one in which the official formally
organized political, economic, and social institutions of the state have failed, ceased to
function, or no longer exist in their capacity as the organs by which to organize and order
the state.77 Structural collapse and institutional failure occur when the state’s political
and economic system are no longer able to effectively ingest societal and international
inputs and convert them into desired domestic and national outputs. The institutions
become overwhelmed with inputs and begin to falter in their inability to process the
“ 1. William Zartman, Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration ofLegitimate Authority
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 1-2,5-6, 10.
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growing number of societal demands and eventually cease to function as an effective
means by which order society. With no effective governing or societal institutions by
which to effectively organize it, the state’s structural collapse culminates in the erosion of
its political, social, and, tenitorial integrity. The collapse and failure of the state are
paralleled by infrastructural collapse as the means and resources required for their
maintenance are no longer available.78
However, state collapse may also occur due to civil or intrastate conflict in which
the state’s institutions and infrastructure are destroyed in military conflict and territory
possibly lost through annexation.79 State collapse also necessarily describes a condition
in which the state’s material capabilities are reduced to such a degree that the state is no
longer able to maintain the elements of its’ own sovereignty or provide for the basic daily
needs of the state. The state essentially has no means by which to pursue its national
interest, enhance its material capabilities, or provide for its national security. The state is
essentially powerless and for political and diplomatic purposes ceases to exist. To ward
off the continual possibility and likelihood of state failure and collapse elements within or
outside the state often pursue or establish international relationships that will maintain the
structural and territorial integrity of the state. External assistance and intervention
possibly serves as a means to secure the state’s immediate survival or facilitate its
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Such relationships are founded in United Nations peace
keeping and humanitarian regimes, international aid regimes in the form of loans and




Bank, and institution building assistance from wealthy developed and developing states.80
Peace keeping, humanitarian, and mediation missions to halt political and civil conflict,
restore civil order, and provide humanitarian relief in war torn and famine stricken areas
contemporarily have become necessary measures to halt state failure and collapse.
Leadership Style/Type Influences
The behavior and relations of the state are also in part a product of the type or
style of leadership in the executive and legislative offices and institutions of the state.
Leadership type and styles are an outgrowth of the impact the state’s culture, institutions,
social composition, and education base on the personality, character, and background of
its governing officials. Both individual and group decision making in policy formulation
are the byproduct of the intersection of institutional structures and the collective
worldview, preferences, personality, and background of both the national leader and
governing officials.8’ State leadership acts as a central institution in facilitating either
structural dependence and dysfunctionality, or structural independence and functionality.
The variations in leadership style or type within the second and third tier of states
generally include nationalist, democratic, authoritarian-survivalist, kieptocratic, neo
patrimonial, and neo-colonial style rule.
Government and public institutions in the lower second and third tier of states
have generally been marked by the central weighting of power into the executive offices
of government with little or no institutional checks and balances on executive power.
With little or no checks and balances on executive power, the internal politics of the state
80 Ibid., 207-209, 211-212,215-217.
81 Kegley and Wittkopf, 503, 506, 517.
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become defmed by a struggle to control the executive office. Control of the executive
office effectively grants the leadership and its accompanying interest groups unfettered
access to state resources and the international community. 82 Essential to the maintenance
of executive power, control of the military as the state’s most physically powerful and
mobilized institution has been instrumental in regime survival in Global South states.
Overwhelmingly military power more so than popular legitimacy has been utilized to
justify and maintain the positions of state leaders giving an authoritarian character to the
governments of many states.83 As a result regime survival above good governance has
become a key fixture of domestic government and international relations in the second
and third tier. The international relations of the state are utilized as a tool to ensure
regime security in maintaining select officials in the executive office.84
Nationalist
Nationalist leadership focuses on creating a structurally independent and
functional state through building internal institutions and emphasizing a national state
identity. Leadership seeks to govern in the interest of the state national group defined in
terms of enhancing their material well being. Justifications for leadership positions are
based on the moral authority and capacity of the leaders to act in the interest of the
national group. Leadership positions are gained and maintained both through systems of
fair elections and by force and power. Both authoritarian and pluralistic political
82 Zein Kebonang, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Promoting Foreign Direct
Investment Through Moral Political Leadership” Africa Instight vol. 35, no 1 (April 2005): 5.
83 Patrick J. McGowan, “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa 1955-2004” Armed Forces & Society vol.
32, no. 2 (January 2006) : 237-238.
84 Taylor, 415.
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institutions are employed in the policy decision making process of nationalist leaders and
governments.85 Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere was an example a nationalistic leader.
Democratic
Democratic leadership centers on decision making through a majority rule system
to mediate or arrive at a consensus between competing societal interests. Justifications
for leadership positions are based on a system of open elections and maintained by the
rule of law. The leadership seeks to govern by satisfying the broadest range of group and
individual interests. Pluralistic and liberal institutions and organizations are utilized in
the decision making process and formation of policy. The power of the executive office
is checked by secondary and tertiary branches of government along with civil society to
limit the possibility for the abuse or over extension of executive power. Leadership
positions are justified based on the popular or representative consent of the population.86
Ghana’s Samuel Kuffour was an example of this form of leadership.
Authoritarian-Survivalist
Authoritarian-survivalist leadership is preoccupied with systematic efforts to
preserve, maintain, and extend leadership offices for an undefined period of time beyond
any democratic or constitutional mandate.87 This form of leadership is common in
unsecure environments housing competing national, ethnic, and race groups. Both
foreign and domestic policy serve as tools by which the governing elements of the state
85 Kegley and Wittkopf, 517, 520.
86Lim, 159-161.
87 The term authoritarian-survivalist was utilized to represent both personalist and militaristic forms of
authoritarianism.
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secure their regime’s survival and hold on to national power. International relationships
are utilized as a tool to bolster and reinforce the power position of an individual leader or
group in an effort to control competing or threatening internal state elements. State
leadership domestically wards off competition through incremental limited political
participation, fmancial co-optation, and the application of force. 88
Justifications for leadership positions are based on the ability of the ruling regime to
maintain their power and position relative to political competitors. Leadership positions
are gained through democratic and nondemocratic means, but are maintained by any
means necessary and available inclusive of external assistance. Small inner circle groups
are employed in the decision making process for policy formulation. Survivalist regimes
may forgo the pursuit of national security objectives in exchange for regime security
guarantees by facilitating relationships of neo-colonialism, dependency, and
underdevelopment with other international actors. Nigeria’s Sani Abacha was an
example of this form of leadership.
Authoritarian-Moralist
Authoritarian-moralist leadership is preoccupied with systematic efforts to
preserve, maintain, and extend leadership offices beyond any democratic or constitutional
mandate in efforts toward building a functional state with strong institutions and a strong
national identity.89 Leadership seeks to govern in the broad interests of the state focusing
88 Ibid., 177-179.
89 The term authoritarian-moralist was employed to describe authoritarian regimes which engage in
developmental governance and have elements of nationalist leadership.
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on enhancing their material well being while minimalizing domestic opposition.9°Both
foreign and domestic policy serves as tools by which the governing elements of the state
dually secure their regime’s survival and govern in the interest of the state. Leadership
positions are gained both through democratic and nondemocratic means, but are
maintained by any method necessary to retain power. Justifications for leadership
positions are based both on the ability of the ruling regime to maintain their power and
position, and the moral authority and capacity of the leaders to act in the interest of the
state. State leadership domestically wards off competition through incremental limited
political participation, fmancial co-optation, and the application of force. International
relationships are utilized by moral-authoritarians as a tool to bolster and reinforce the
power position of individual leaders or groups in an effort to control competing or
threatening internal actors. Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings was an example of this form of
leadership.
Kieptocratic
Kieptocratic nile refers to a form of leadership where the decisions, actions, and
behavior of the state domestically and internationally are merely an extension of the
leader’s personality and personal preferences. Both domestic and foreign policy are an
outgrowth of the personality type, education, self perception, and sum total of the life
experiences of the national leader. The behavior and relations of the state may be
predicted with great degrees of accuracy based on an assessment of the leader. The
population of the state in turn suffers or benefit from the determinations of the national
90AIence, 164, 176-177. Rod Alence briefly refers to the effectiveness and virtues of non-democratic
regimes in development governance in Africa.
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leader whether it be prospects for modernization or ongoing dependency and
underdevelopment. The international relationships formed and maintained by the state
become the sole determination of the national leader with little or no domestic
accountability for the repercussions of their decisions or actions. Kleptocratic leaders
gain their positions by varying means but maintain their position through a combination
of co-optation, domestic repression, force, and external assistance. Power is the central
basis by which leadership positions are justified. Uganda’s Idi Arnin’s and Zaire’s
Mobutu are examples of the kleptocratic form of rulership.
Neo-patrimonial
Neo-patrimonial rule refers to a form of leadership in which the national leader
rules primarily in their own personal interest, and second in the interests of societal
clients through a network of patron-client relationships. Neo-patrimonial rule employs
executive power dually in their personal interests and the interest of their clients and
patrons towards enriching the national leader and maintaining their power. Neo
patrimonial rule combines the characteristics of classical patrimonialism, presidentialism,
and clientelism within the structure and institutions of modern government. Like
patrimonialism, it suggests that the possessions and resources of the national territory are
at the disposal of the leader to do with as they see necessary. Neo-patrimonialism’s
elements of presidentialism centralize government and state power solely into the
executive office with essentially no high level checks or balances on their actions. Its
clientelist elements allow for the granting of personal favors, resources, and services to
varying societal groups and individuals to solicit unbridled political and personal
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support.9’
Justifications for leadership positions are based on the ability and capacity of the
leaders to satisfy interests and maintain the loyalty of their patrons. Leadership positions
may be gained and maintained either through a system of elections or by force and
power. Executive decision making utilizes group consultation with patrons and allies in
the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. The interests of ethnic, tribal, and class
groups are met through their representative in the executive office’s unlimited access to
the resources and tools of the state. The international relationships of the state become a
tool to secure the domestic interests of select groups within the state. Uganda’s Yoweri
Musveni is an example of neo-patrimonial style rule.
Neo-colonial
Neo-colonial style leadership is a system of leadership in which the national
leaders of the state govern according to the directives and interests of its former
colonizer.92 Irrespective of the manner in which they come to power or maintain their
rulership, they govern and maintain international relationships according to the dictates of
an external power. Authoritarian or democratic means may be utilized to achieve the
directives of the external power based on whether or not the masses perceive such a
relationship to be in their interests. Irrespective of how the decision making process
occurs or the institutions and groups involved, state decisions reflect a neo-colonial
relationship. Justifications for leadership positions are generally external based primarily
Kebonang, 5-6.
92 This study interprets Kwame N’Krumah’s “Neo-Colonialism” not only in political economy,
development, and international relations terms, but also as a type or style of state leadership.
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on the willingness and ability of the leadership to execute the directives of the former
colonizer. If the executive office cannot act in the interests of the former colonizer and
maintain domestic order and stability, that leader is subsequently removed and a new
leader installed.93 The Republic of Chad’s president Idriss Derby is representative of
such a leadership style in the relationship he maintains with France.
Perception/World View Factors
The behavior and relations of the state are also in part an outgrowth of the
perceptions and world view of both state leadership and institutions of government.
Leadership perceptions and world views are derived from the background, culture,
education, experiences, and personality of governing officials; while institutional
perceptions and woridviews are derived from institutional specialization, tradition, and
mass or elite understandings and preferences for both domestic and international order.
The perceptions and world view of individuals and institutions create the normative
parameters for the decision making process by shaping the lenses through which the
decision maker perceives political realities. Preferences for domestic and international
order and epistemological orientation preclude any rational pursuit of domestic or foreign
policy interests.94 The variants in perception and worldview factors include globalist-
regional-national views, center-/polar-satellite views, racial and ethnic views, religious
views, and civilizational views.
Global, Regional, and National Views
States have varying ideas or views of themselves and their role in the international
93Nmah.
Kegley and Wittkopf 483-484, 506, 528.
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environment based on degree and extent to which they are able to project power and
extend their influence nationally, regionally, and globally.95 The elite group of first tier
states with the greatest economic, military, political, and diplomatic capacity perceives
the international environment in global terms and the pursuit of their national interests
through foreign policy and international relations are also global in scale. The
relationships of these states extend into every major region of the world and account for
the greatest percentage of international activity. These states include the United States,
Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Russia, India and
the European Union.96
However, select other states in the first, second, and third tiers even though not
having global reach, have positioned themselves within the global economy and political
system to make their impact globally relevant. States such as South Korea, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Cuba have assumed such positions. The
remaining first tier and most second tier states subscribe to a regional view in formulating
foreign policy and conducting international relations. In terms of economics, military,
and political influence, they do not have the capacity for global reach or expansion and
their national interests are best pursued and realized through a regional approach.
Individually their influence largely does not extend beyond the states of their region and
they may seek to act in concert to augment their level of influence and military or
economic capacity. These include states such as Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Poland,
This study holds power projection in both military and non-military forms as a key facet of the
imagery state leaders and institutions hold of themselves and the world in establishing their preferences for
domestic and international order.
Goldstein, 78-80.
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South Africa, Argentina, and Chile.97
Most third tier states at present also participate in some form of regional
organization or institution. However, even though participating in regional organizations
and institutions, in practical terms most third tier state’s foreign policy and international
relations is conditioned by a highly national view of the state. These third tier states
perceive themselves largely within a national context practically played out within
isolationist and dependency relations. They do not house the structural capacity to
effectively project power or extern any form of influence beyond their own boarders
wielding little to no economic, military, or political influence their own regions. They
have little to no impact on the structure or functioning of the international system and do
not represent significant percentages of international activity.98 Their subscription to a
national view is evidenced by their weighting of bilateral relations with first and second
tier states over those of regional relations and institutional or organization efforts.
Examples of such third tier states are Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Uruguay, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
Polar-Satellite/Center-Periphery
Several states subscribe to a polar-satellite view of the world occurring within the
context of center periphery relations.99 Within this view the world is ultimately divided
into a series of poles of power where most states fall under the polar influence of the
‘ Ibid., 80-8 1.
Ibid., 81.
This study understands dependency and world system’s frameworks to not only constitute political
economy and international relations frameworks, but also as key views, understandings, and preferences
held by governing officials and institutions.
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system’s most powerful state actors.100 These global metropoles constitute the center of
the global economic and political system comprised primarily of first tier states that
maintain second and third tier state satellites in the economic and political periphery of
the system. The metropole’s satellite states within the periphery have been
determined by geostrategic value, resources, spheres of influence, and historical
relationships. However, select second tier states form a semi-periphery in which they are
neither metropoles nor expressly satellites but ascending transitionary states within the
international system.
The elite group of first tier states with the greatest economic, military, political,
and diplomatic capacity perceives the international environment to be divided according
to the distribution of geopolitical power and influence diffused into global spheres of
influence. Their behavior and relations are determined by their perceptions of the
international distribution of power, and capacity to maintain or extend their influence
over satellite states in the periphery of the international system. These states include the
United States, Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil,
Russia, India and the European Union.
As a prerequisite to policy formulation, satellite states perceive their existence and
role in the international environment within the parameters of international polarity.
Their foreign policy and international relations are conditioned by their relationship with
the metropole. Pursuit of the national interests, power enhancement, institutional




considerations of polar interests and secondarily on national interests. Within this
context, the greater percentage of independent Francophone states Central and West
Africa essentially view themselves and behave as satellites of France.
Policy Institutions and State Behavioral Outputs
In response to the inputs imposed on the state by the international and domestic
environment, the state responds through developing policy that practically addresses its
wants and needs. State decision-making is consolidated and formalized through its
policy making institutions in which the determinant influences on the state’s behavior are
filtered through its domestic and foreign policy institutions. The state’s foreign policy
institutions are responsible for the official actions or inactions of the state as sanctioned
by its governing authorities towards other actors and the international system.102
Whereas, the state’s domestic policy institutions are responsible for the official actions or
inactions of the state’s governing officials towards the state and its internal elements to
address its internal needs and requirements)°3
However, rather than emerging as wholly divided and separate entities, in the age
of globalization and interdependency state behavioral outputs increasingly emerge in the
form of intermestic policy. Intermestic policy suggests that states’ foreign policies are so
closely linked to national domestic outcomes that they cannot be wholly separated from
domestic policy considerations and vice versa.104 The globalized and interconnected
102 Kegley and Wittkopf, 7.
103 RobertO. Keohane and Helen V. Mimer ed., Internationalization and Domestic Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), 3.
‘° Kegley and Wittkopf, 373-374.
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structure of the international political and economic system dynamically link the
domestic issues of most states to the international issues of the international system in the
post-cold war era. As a result, foreign and domestic policy both have either a directly or
indirectly corresponding foreign or domestic policies to balance their internal and
external effects. Policy balancing is managed institutionally where governments have
developed the means by which to mediate or moderate between foreign interests and
domestic interests in order to negate policy clashes.’°
However, where government instruments are not present to moderate or mediate
between domestic and foreign policy effects and outcomes, foreign policy effects on
domestic policy and vice versa, are determined by the dominant political paradigm or
organizing principle around which the state government functions.’°6 In such an instance
there may be no counter balancing between the effects of domestic and foreign policy on
each other. As a result, policy linked to globalization and the interconnected structure of
the international system, along with the general international effects of those phenomena,
may adversely affect the state domestically. In the African region where multi-
nationalism overwhelmingly predominates the political process and democratic
government has not fully taken hold, the domestic political fallout and impact of foreign
policy on the state plays itself out along neo-patrimonial, neo-colonial, kieptocratic,
ethnic, tribal, religious, and class lines.’07 This occurs particularly in regards to the
process by which determinations for the expenditure of government revenues, disbursal
105 Ibid., 373-374.
106 Kegley and Raymond, 59-60.
107 Kebonang, 5-6.
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of international aid, and management of the economic exploitation of national resources
and wealth are made.
The intermestic policy of the state then enters the international environment as
behavioral outputs to which other international actors and the international system itself
must contend as environmental inputs)08 Each state, theoretically adding to the milieu of
activity comprising international relations, actively engaging in the process of statehood
and with active systemic participation. From the assumption of the existence of an
international environment with dominating system and state variables, the process begins
again in continuity of the ongoing behavioral life cycle and maintenance of the
international system and its states. 109
108 Kegley and Wittkopf, 15. Kegley and Wittkopf’s foreign policy model, “the Funnel of Causality”
illustrates the emergence of policy as outputs that are simultaneously generate feedback in the international




In seeking to establish a theoretical position in favor of the greater efficiency and
effectiveness of a multiple theory multi-determinant approach over a single theory
primary determinant approach to African International Relations, a comparative case
study has been evaluated to illustrate the differences between the two approaches. The
case regards South Africa’s role in the establishment of the African Union in 2001,’ This
case presents both a syncarpathic (multiple determinant approach) and realist model
(primary determinant) of South Africa’s actions to allow for direct a comparisons of the
descriptive and explanatory utility of each approach in explaining the behavior and
relations of the African state. Each case is accompanied by a diagram illustrating the
major assumptions and points of the theories utilized.
Case Study 1: South Africa and the Creation of the African Union
The Syncarpathic model of African state behavior and relations illustrates and
explains the behavior and actions of South Africa in the creation of the African Union as
the product of interlocking determinants beyond a singular primary or central
determinant. The actions of South Africa led by President Thabo Mbeki towards the
Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the
Creation of the African Union” African Affairs no. 103 (2004) : 249-267., Chris Alden and Garth le Pere,
“South Africa’s Post-apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity” Review ofAfrican
Political Economy, no. 100 (2004) : 2 83-297. This case study is based primarily on the accounts and
explanations catalogued by Thomas Kwasi Tieku on the role of three of Africa’s major actors in the
formation of the African Union, and supported by Chris Alden and Garth le Pere’s evaluation of South
Africa’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid era. Tieku, Alden, and le Pere’s work are used to illustrate the




establishment of the African Union represent the intersecting of a variety of factors
within the state and the system that influenced South Africa’s behavior. The
environmental factors and inputs leading to the creation of the African Union itself were
the necessity to reform the Organization of African Unity into an effective tool to manage
the region wide changes in the continent that accompanied the close of the Cold War.2
The region wide breakdowns of civil and sub-regional security and the emergence of a
new liberal international economic order, all necessitated institutional upgrades to
effectively address arising continental issues. The reforming of the OAU occurred within
the context of the newly emergent unipolar world left by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
leaving the United States as the sole superpower. In this new international environment,
post-apartheid South Africa emerged as the leading second tier, artificial multinational
state in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa’s leading role in establishing the African
Union may be attributed to a collusion of factors both within South Africa, the African
region, and the international system.3
Within a Syncarpathic model, the determinant factors in South Africa’s behavior
include realist factors, liberal factors, class factors, structure and function factors,
leadership factors, and worldview factors. Beginning with worldview and perception
factors, the first two post-apartheid presidents and their administrations assumed that
post-apartheid South Africa would play the role of de facto leader of the African
continent. South Africa’s material capability teamed with its moral transformation and
transition to democratic government, justified its actions as the regional champion of
2 Tieku, 249-250, 252.

























































democracy, good governance, and foreign direct investment regionally and in the third
world. South Africa moved from a racially dominated woridview, to a complex mix of
neo-liberal and realist views reflective of the post-Cold War world.4 This woridview
dynamically affected the leadership factors in post-apartheid South Africa’s behavior
which is firmly rooted in democratic leadership within modern liberal institutions. Even
though under President Nelson Mandela the personality of the president was extremely
pervasive in policy formulation, under his successor Thabo Mbeki, state decision-making
became decidedly more the product of institutional processes.5
This post-racial woridview, teamed with the personality and leadership style of
President Thabo Mbeki, in part, informed South Africa’s judgment that a transformation
of the Organization of African Unity was necessary to accomplish South African
domestic and foreign policy goals. Mbeki personally pushed for the creation of the
African Union because both he and the South African foreign policy establishment
believed it was fundamental to achieving South Africa’s long term interests.6 South
African officials fundamentally understood that the ultimate goal of South Africa
attaining a middle power, upper second tier state status in the political and economic
hierarchy of states of the international system could not be achieved apart from the
aggregate development of the region as a whole.7 These views along with the actions of
the leadership were enlightened and enabled by other influential interlinked determinant
‘ Le Pere, 283, 286, 289.
Ibid., 287-288.
6 Tieku, 253-255.
Le Pere, 283, 288, 290-292.
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factors in the state’s behavior.
The realist factors influencing South Africa’s active leading role in the creation of
the African Union begin with its traditional power position as the sub-regional hegemon
in Southern Africa, and regional position as one of the continents four most powerful
states by any measures. In the African region, South Africa is the most industrialized
state (limited industrialization) with the greatest material capabilities, economically and
militarily. South Africa boasted the largest national gross domestic product (GDP),
highest per capita income, and most advanced military equipment and trained army based
both on its limited industrial, and advanced agro-mineral extractive economy.8
Overlapping the realist factors in its behavior, structure and function factors suggest that
South Africa may be considered only one of two structurally dysfunctional but
independent states on the African continent. South Africa is able to sufficiently provide
for the daily requirements and necessities of the state without external assistance, while at
the same time absorbing the fallouts of its dysfunctional institutions and social system.
Due to the extremely limited regional diffusion of state power in post-Cold War Africa,
South Africa has no military challengers in its sub-region and few possible contenders on
the continent beyond Nigeria or Egypt. As a result, with no significant security
challenges from other states, South Africa’s primary interests revolve around the
establishment and maintenance of civil, sub-regional, and regional peace and security as a
precursor to further integrating itself and the continent into the neoliberal structure of the
global economy.9
CIA World Fact Book: www. ciaworldfactbook. corn/South Africa.
156
The liberal factors in South Africa’s behavior crossect the realist factors in its
international relations as South Africa’s governing officials seek to utilize liberal
economics and multilateral institutions to enhance their power and material capabilities.
Its governing officials are fundamentally interested in expanding South Africa’s
economic base and development domestically, maintaining its sub-regional position as
economic and security hub, encourage foreign direct investment in the continent, and
further integrating post-apartheid South Africa into the global economy. Among
international class factors, within the internationally stratified division of labor and global
production, South Africa seeks to position itself as Africa’s central economic, trading,
and production hub for commodity and select capital goods. Its leadership wishes to
extend South Africa’s economic reach and influence across the content with their own
investments and extensions of regional trade. South Africa holds as a core goal the
making of itself and the African continent attractive destinations for foreign direct
investment from industrialized and industrializing states.10 The cumulative effect of
South Africa effectively pursuing these goals is hoped to be its elevation to middle
power, upper second tier state status in the international political and economic hierarchy
of states.
However, the pursuit of such ambitious regional economic goals requires region
wide interstate and domestic civil stability and cooperation to be effectively undertaken.
The magnitude of the tasks involved was sufficiently beyond the military, economic, and
political power and influence of the South African state to undertake on its own. As
Tieku, 253-255.
‘° Le Pere, 287, 292-294.
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such, South Africa’s leadership has sought to utilize multilateralism and institutionalism
as the central mechanisms by which to pursue its sub-regional, regional, and global
interests.11 Regionally, within the parameters of institutionalism, South Africa favored
the establishment of a four to five state balance of power and regional conflict
management system by which to achieve a sociopolitical environment conducive to the
growth of investment and trade. The five to seven most powerful and influential African
sub-regional actors within the international status quota (South Africa, Nigeria, Libya,
Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal or Ghana) would manage conflict resolution and
the promotion of peace and stability across the continent through sub-regional, regional,
and international institutions and organizations. South Africa would play a unique role in
this regional management system by positioning itself as the central diplomatic mediator
on the continent’2in conjunction with Nigeria’s role as the primary provider of military
assistance in peacekeeping initiatives. The promotion of democratic leadership and
norms, good governance, and the development of civil society would form an intricate
facet of this institutional approach to developing the region.’3
However, the Organization of African Unity in its Cold War era structure did not
provide sufficient mechanisms by which South Africa could effectively pursue its goals
and interest multilaterally or ideologically. A new framework would be required by
which to pursue South Africa’s agenda necessitating the transformation of the
Organization of African Unity into an effective multilateral institution capable of meeting
“Ibid., 284, 290-29 1.
2 Ibid., 287, 290.
13 Tieku, 255.
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post-Cold War challenges.’4 South Africa would assume a leading position in pushing
for the creation of the AU in order to meet its own interests.
The formal policy decisions in South Africa’s leadership role in transitioning the
Organization of African Unity to the African Union would be three fold. First, President
Mbeki would undertake a rigorous diplomatic initiative across the region to gain the
support of other African states for the creation of the AU.15 Second, President Mbeki
would skillfully negotiate for the ideological foundations of the union to be housed on the
Democratic and liberal principles championed by South Africa.’6 Third, South Africa
would contribute significant funding towards the establishment of the union in housing
the necessary summits and meetings for its creation.17 Fourth, South Africa would
domestically finance, house, and maintain various portions of the AU secretariat within
South Africa alongside Ethiopia.’8 Fifth, South Africa would domestically pre-commit to
playing the intended diplomatic role as the regional peace mediator paralleling Nigeria’s
central military role. These policy decisions were achieved through the democratic
institutional processes of the post-apartheid South African government. They were the
product of consultation and coordination between the executive and legislative branches
of government.
Due in part to the efforts and position of South Africa, teamed with the support
14 Le Pere, 292.
15 Ibid, 290-292.
16 Tieku, 255.
‘ Le Pere, 29 1-293.
18 Ibid., 29 1-292.
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and efforts of both Nigeria and Libya in 2002, the Organization of African Unity was
successfully transitioned into the African Union. 19 South Africa, as have other major
regional actors, has sought to utilize the union to meet both its long and short term
regional and international goals. However, the effectiveness of the African Union as a
foreign policy tool still remains to be evaluated as it remains under a decade old while the
long term conflicts and developmental challenges continue on the continent unabated.
Single theory-Primary Determinant Approach: Example Realism
Within a single theory-primary determinant approach, South Africa’s actions
towards the creation of the African Union are understood to be an outgrowth of a central
or primary determinant within the state and international system. In building a realist
model of South African behavior, a realist framework irnniediately assumes the central
factors driving South Africa’s behavior to include: necessary expansion or enhancement
of its material capabilities, the expansion of both its regional and international power and
influence, the balancing out of competing regional powers, and the expansion of
institutional structures, regimes, and frameworks as a means to augment its power and
influence regionally and internationally.20
Descriptively, South Africa wields hegemonic influence within its sub-region and
is one of the four most powerful states in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is the most
industrialized state with the greatest material capabilities both economically and
militarily. South Africa boasts the largest national GDP, per capita income, and most
“ Tieku, 249.
20 The realist model of South African behavior and relations built in the single theory — primary
determinant approach was developed based on the same sources for the development of the Syncarpathic






























































































































































advanced military equipment and trained army. Due to the extremely limited diffusion of
power among African states in the post-cold war Africa, South Africa faces no military
challengers in its sub-region and few possible contenders on the continent beyond
Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia. In a realist model, South Africa’s primary foreign policy
interest may be described as the expansion of South African power and influence
regionally and internationally to middle power status. A goal to be accomplished through
extending its economic and political reach beyond its sub-region into all of Sub-Saharan
Africa, balancing the power of competing regional states, and ultimately establishing
itself as a regional and international power pole.
However, the magnitude of such goals was sufficiently beyond the military,
economic, and political power and influence of the South African state to achieve by
itself. A chronically weak and underdeveloped African region does not provide an ideal
economic or political environment by which to augment or enhance South African power
and influence internationally; a circumstance beyond South African power to change.
As recourse, South Africa’s leadership sought to utilize multilateralism and
institutionalism as the central mechanisms by which to augment its power and achieve its
regional and global interests. As such, within the parameters of institutional structures,
South Africa would favor the establishment of a six to seven state balance of power and
regional management system by which to achieve a socio-political environment
conducive to its military, political, and economic expansion. The six or seven most
powerful and influential African sub-regional actors within the international status quota




conflict resolution and maintain peace and stability across the continent through sub
regional, regional, and international institutions and organizations. Those same
mechanisms would also serve to check or limit the power other competing regional states,
as well as provide a collective means to check or limit the power of extra-continental
powers in the region.
South Africa would play a unique role in this regional management system by
positioning itself as the central diplomatic mediator on the continent in conj unction with
Nigeria’s role as the primary provider of military assistance in peacekeeping initiatives.
Such a position would make South Africa indispensable politically to continental affairs,
regionally and internationally enhancing its prestige and position globally.
Institutionalism and regime structures would provide a mechanism for South Africa to
prescribe political and economic norms (democracy, constitutionalism, free markets) that
facilitate South African economic expansion and dominance through foreign direct
investment, new markets, and trade. Within such an environment, South Africa’s moral
transformation could justify its de facto leadership and domineering influence within the
institution or organization.
The only existing continental multilateral institution existing by which to pursue
such goals was the Organization of African Unity. However, the OAU in its Cold War
structure did not provide sufficient mechanisms by which South Africa could expand or
augment its powerbase. It served as an ineffective tool by which to pursue South African
foreign policy goals and interest multilaterally or ideologically. The OAU was, in part,
developed to limit the projection of state power relative to the states of the region, but
“i
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also to end the maintenance of colonial power on the continent including apartheid South
Africa’s.2’ A new framework would be required by which to pursue South Africa’s
agenda of power enhancement requiring the transformation of the Organization of
African Unity into an effective multilateral institution allowing for the expanding of
South African power while limiting or balancing the power of its regional competitors.
As a result, South Africa would assume a leading position in pushing for the creation of
the AU in order to meet its own interests. In concert with two or three of the most
powerful sub-regional actors on the continent (Nigeria, Libya, Algeria), South Africa
would act to see through the creation of the African Union.22
The formal policy decisions in South Africa’s leadership role in transitioning the
Organization of African Unity to the African Union would be three fold. First, President
Mbeki would undertake a rigorous diplomatic initiative across the region to gain the
support of other African states for the creation of the AU. Second, President Mbeki
would skillfully negotiate for the ideological foundations of the union to be housed on the
Democratic and liberal principles championed by South Africa. Third, South Africa
would contribute significant funding towards the establishment of the union in housing
the necessary summits and meetings for its creation. Fourth, South Africa would
domestically finance, house, and maintain various portions of the AU secretariat within
South Africa alongside Ethiopia. Fifth, South Africa would domestically pre-commit to
playing the intended diplomatic role as the regional peace mediator paralleling Nigeria’s
central military role. These policy decisions were achieved through the democratic




institutional processes of the post-apartheid South African government. They were the
product of consultation and coordination between the executive and legislative branches
of government.
Case Indicators: Approaches Compared
In the case of South Africa, both the single theory - primary determinant, and
multiple theory - multi-determinant approaches yield informative and descriptive
explanations of the actions and events surrounding South Africa’s behavior. However,
the questions remains as to which explanation grants the most accurate and descriptive
explanation of those actions and the most clear indicator of the active determinants in
those actions. Even though realism is employed in this case, any single theory primary
determinant approach (liberalism, class analysis) could be utilized to illustrate the utility
of any such approach to state behavior and relations in contrast to a multiple theory —
multiple determinant approach. Realism and all primary determinant approaches
necessarily claim the validity of their position as primary in the actions of the state, but
do not necessarily rule out or invalidate the role of other factors in the states behavior.
Rather, those associated factors are subordinated to the primary role of realism or any
equivalent primary determinant.
However, the primary advantage of the multiple theory - multi-determinant
approach illustrated by Syncarpathic theory is a significantly more diverse explanation of
South Africa’s behavior and relations granted by its inclusive foundations. It does not
have to make predetermined normative assumptions based on power (or any other
position) on behalf of South African leaders and institutions regarding the motivations for
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all of their actions. It attributes state behavior to a number of non-hierarchical, but
organically interlinked determinants emerging out of the characteristic features of both
the state and system. It creates allows for the very practical reality that multiple forces
are pulling at the state to act on a singular event of which security, power, and material
capability may only be a component part. Particularly in regard to weak incoherent states
who have no real conception of active state power within or without their boundaries.
In particular, the realist model engenders more challenges in highlighting the role
of leadership and their world view in acting. The realist model makes broad assumptions
on the part of South Africa with no balancing of influences other than power or material
capability on the behavior of leadership. Within the realm of psychoanalysis and
character analysis, individual and institutional worldview and leadership type/style are
not solely or directly attributed to power in its multivariant forms. The literature is very
clear that those determinants are an outgrowth of multiple factors of which of power
structures and calculations that may be included but not solely limited to. The personal
background and lifestyle of individual decision makers, teamed with the role of
bureaucratic, institutional, and class structure dramatically impact both individual and
group decision making. The Syncarpathic model allows for a conception of leadership
and development of a woridview beyond power considerations.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In answering the initial question regarding the superior efficiency of a meta
theoretical approach versus a general theory approach in explaining the behavior and
relations of the African state, this study has sought to illustrate that the actions and
relationships of the state are better explained via a multiple theory multi-determinant
approach. The assumption and acceptance of the limited explanatory truth of the most
prominent theories warrants the use of a meta-theoretical method to effectively combine
those truths to adequately explain the behavior and relations of the state as a multifaceted
entity. It is the critiques levied by general theories upon each other that indicate the
shortcomings in the positions and assumptions of contending conventional and non-
conventional general theories as limited truths. Of which several of their base
assumptions when matched against empirical evidence are not reflective of the empirical
realities of the international environment. The meta-theoretical method allows the
aspects of those theories with the greatest descriptive utility to be brought together in a
non-contradictory manner to allow for a greater and more efficient revelation of truth.
However, past approaches to African International Relations and the African state
that have explicitly or implicitly disagreed with the shortcomings of both conventional
and non-conventional theory have generally failed to structure an applied study, review,
or theory fundamentally correcting these assumptions where they are acknowledged to
not be accurate by their own proponents. Furthermore, they have also failed to integrate
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the useful aspects of competing theories at the level of base assumptions. This study
sought to not only indicate the theoretical inconsistencies of conventional and
nonconventional theory, but also to present assumptions consistent with the practical
realities of the international environment. There was a conscious choice and effort to not
work around these theoretical shortcomings and positions, but to present the correct
positions omitting the acknowledged inconsistencies. There has been no attempt to
uphold dogmatic positions for the sake of theoretical traditions which distort the realities
of structure and agency in state behavior. Where there is a known correction to be made,
an attempt was made to place the most correct information in its place. Therefore,
several of the base assumptions in the developed meta-theory resulting differ
significantly from many of the assumptions of the most commonly applied theoretical
frameworks.
The assumptions of Syncarpathic theory, the meta-theory developed in this study,
has been presented as paralleling the realities of the empirical world as revealed in the
partial truths of conventional and non-conventional theory. It’s structuring of
international order parallels the realities of the international political, economic, and
ecological system and the multiple state units within it. Syncarpathic theory, by a linear
measure, may be evaluated both on its structuring of international order and identification
of system-unit characteristics and function. Syncarpathic theory’s practical parallels are
generally acknowledged throughout IR literature, but are at the same time immediately
obvious and evident in casual observation of the international environment without
extensive statistical data or research.
168
First, it is generally acknowledged within JR literature that states house significant
differences in structure, behavior, rationality, and decision making. International relations
literature regularly makes distinctions between the behavior and characteristics of states
in the First World versus the Third World, between Most Developed Countries and Least
Developed Countries, and between center and periphery states. As such, Syncarpathic
theory acknowledges nation-states as the most dominant actors in the system, but also
acknowledges that they are not the only states occupying the international environment.
Rather, the majority of states fall into a different category in this study designated as
artificial multi-national states. This reality has been generally acknowledged but there
has been no theoretical designation or classification of these states as differently defmed
entities that will not eventually evolve into functional nation states. Further, the broad
literature is replete with evidence that even though states are generally rational actors,
they all need not be like units to theoretically achieve unit rationality within the system.
Neoliberal economics, international ideological prescriptions for democracy and good
governance, growing consensus for concerted action to combat environmental
catastrophes, and the slow evolution of a global human rights regime all attest to the
existence and functioning of state rationality based on national interests. Just as in the
marketplace, self-interest takes precedence without all of the units having to be the same
to have orderly interaction.
General observations of the structure of the international system, global economy,
and their institutions clearly justifies Syncarpathic theory’s assertion of hierarchical
anarchy in which weaker states are more highly subject to regimes of global governance
A
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that mitigate against anarchy than the most powerful and influential states. Weak states
are more highly subject to the rules and regulations of international order than powerful
and influential states. They must act within the confmes and parameters of a system they
did not establish and do not maintain. The power structure and contributions in the UN,
IMF, World Bank, and WTO all attest to this reality. The permanent seats of the UN
Security Council, the distribution of votes and exchange capacity in the IMF, breakdown
of trade talks within the WTO, and the nuclear nonproliferation regimes, all illustrate the
international hierarchy among states. The global diffusion of international manufacturing
and industry worldwide versus single or dual commodity exports and oil extraction
directly indicate the stratification of the global economy. In order to participate, weak
states must follow the rules or seek to establish their own international system which they
control and maintain. The cost and consequences for not following those rules and norms
for them are significantly higher than for those states at the center or semi-periphery of
the system. In the post-World War H international system, there have been no significant
disciplinary measures against great or superpowers for not following the rules. This was
most recently illustrated by the United States’ invasion of Iraq and its breaking of the
Geneva Conventions by torturing terrorist suspects or participant without repercussions.
The most difficult measure of Syncarpathic theory is an evaluation and
justification of its normative conception of the state and system. Traditional views such
as realism conceived of the state and system in sovereign terms. State was defmed by its
bounded territory and population, sovereign governing authority over that territory and its
inhabitants, and ability to maintain the territorial integrity and sovereign authority over
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the state. The state system was understood to be founded on regimes of sovereignty
which form the basis for relationships in the international political system and global
economy. These formed the normative parameters for realist analysis. However, within
Syncarpathic theory, a distinct effort was made to conceive of the state beyond the linear
normative parameters of sovereignty that defmed 19th and 20th centuries’ theory. This
position emerged largely as a reaction to realist sovereignty regimes which failed to
acknowledge that all states are not fully sovereign or founded on Westphalian
sovereignty.
Syncarpathic theory presents the state as an organismic entity comprised of
interlinked sociopolitical, economic, and ecological systems paralleling the organismic
structure of the international environment. The international environment itself being
comprised of a global environment (ecological system), a political system, an economic
system, a world population, and material culture. This biosocial and structural view is
rooted in a necessary preference to not view the state linearly as a physical security
mechanism for sovereignty maintenance, or as an instrument or tool for global production
and accumulation of capital, or an instrument of class conflict, or a means of
nationallracial/ethnic division or synthesis, or as an ecological system in competition with
industrial production. Due to the character of international political discourse in the
second millennium era, there was a distinct preference to see the state as all of those
things simultaneously in difference to the linear approaches of the twentieth century. As
such, the systems comprising the state are not viewed as easily delinked, separated, or
ranked hierarchically. They are dynamically intertwined in a level of complexity in close
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likeness to an organism, or corporate organization.
Within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the framework presented in
Syncarpathic theory is of greatest importance to fundamentally present the behavior and
relations of the African state as a product of an equilateral distribution system and state
forces. In a 21 century analysis of the African state, it has become necessary to point
out and identify the complex balance that has evolved between the structure of the
international system and the degree of agency exercised by the Affican state in producing
its present behavior. Previous approaches rooted in realist, systems, and international
class schools of thought have traditionally attributed African state behavior and relations
to structural forces emerging out of the structure of the international system. Liberals,
cultural theorists, psychoanalysts, and statist approaches rooted in structure and function
factors conversely have traditionally attributed African state behavior and relations to the
internal agency exercised by the state. However, fifty years after independence, and a
decade after the long shocks of the close of the Cold War, the behavior and relations of
the African state have settled into distinct patterns of collaboration between state and
system actors. African states behavior is an outgrowth of the collusion of domestic and
international interests within the state and system. As such, purely systemic arguments
for Africa’s condition contemporarily are very difficult to maintain, particularly in
regards to the ongoing gross human rights and development record of African rulers
towards their populations. From this position and understanding, any framework utilized
to assess the African state and its relations in the 2l century must necessarily reflect that





In seeking to validate the descriptive and explanatory utility of the Syncarpathic
framework, there is the distinct theoretical challenge of time and consensus. The theory
must be tested and evaluated on a host of past cases, present cases, and future case
predictions. As such, numerous cases must be modeled against the theory which will
require extensive work and dedicated time in regional studies. Cases based on future
predictions by defmition require time to evaluate the eventual scenario taking as little as
several months to as many as years or decades. Further, there must be an extensive
marketing or promotion of such a theoretical approach in order to build a positive
consensus for its acceptance and application. New theoretical frameworks often are more
popular with greater consensus beyond the lifetime of their originators than during their
lifetime. As such, measuring the long-term viability of the theory may take a substantial
period of time beyond the completion of this study.
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